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Preface
This dissertation presents my research work on policy integration and anonymous commu-
nication for protecting personal information. The dissertation is the result of the research
during the Ph.D. course at the Division of Electrical, Electronic and Information Engineer-
ing, Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka University. The dissertation is organized as
follows.
Chapter 1 describes the background, the motivation, and the purpose of this research, and
presents the outline of this dissertation.
Chapter 2 presents an overview of two privacy protection technologies, policy integration
and anonymous communication systems, which we focus on in the dissertation. We also
clarify the characteristic of this dissertation, comparing our approach with related work in
the research areas.
Chapter 3 describes a policy integration framework for unifying management of various
access rights management systems. Policy integration is a technique which generates in-
tegrated policies suitable for all the systems by using inheritance relations of access rights.
Since each system has its own inheritance relation, we need to integrate each inheritance rela-
tion in order to obtain inheritance relations for policy generation. Focusing on the integration
of inheritance relations, we introduce a matrix-based algorithm for integrating inheritance re-
lations of access rights for policy generation. Since inheritance relations of access rights are
found in subject, resource, and action categories for existing systems, our algorithm first in-
tegrates inheritance relations in each category, and next, integrates inheritance relations of all
categories. It is proven that these operations can be carried out by basic matrix operations.
This enables us to implement the integration algorithm very easily.
In Chapters 4 and 5, we analyze the performance of an anonymous communication sys-
tem called 3-Mode Net (3MN). Although 3MN has more advantages than other anonymous
communication systems, the performance of 3MN is not analyzed in detail. In Chapter 4,
we evaluate the number of relay nodes and the number of encryption required for commu-
nication in 3MN. In particular, we give explicit formulas of their probability distributions,
expectations, and variances. From the obtained formulas, we investigate the impacts of the
probabilities of mode selections and the initial multiplicity of encryption on the behavior of
3MN. We also show several requirements for avoiding the situation where the number of
relay nodes becomes extremely large.
In Chapter 5, we investigate sender anonymity against collaborating nodes who collude
with each other in order to identify a message sender. We derive the probability that the first
immediate predecessor of all the collaborating nodes on the communication path coincides
with the message sender. The probability is derived from probability generating functions.
Using the result, we consider the influences of the probabilities of mode selections and the
initial multiplicity of encryption on sender anonymity against collaborating nodes. From the
results obtained in Chapter 4, we also investigate the relationship between the number of
relay nodes and sender anonymity, and consider a condition both for providing high sender
anonymity and for reaching a receiver through a small number of relay nodes.
Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation.
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Introduction
As Information Technology (IT) has developed rapidly, various IT systems and services are
essential components for the present society. A lot of people have personal computers and
use Internet. Thus, they treat various information on their computers, and receive numerous
services on the Internet. For example, we can buy almost all goods on the Internet and
conduct financial transactions online without going outside. We also create many documents
as electrical data with computers without creating by hand.
In the deep penetration of IT into our lives, one of the important issues is how “personal
information” is handled. According to the personal information protection law in Japan,
personal information means information about an individual which can identify the specific
individual. For example, the name and the address of an individual are his personal infor-
mation. On the Internet world, personal information includes the mail address and the IP
address of an individual as well as the information caused by the behavior of an individual
such as communication records and purchase records.
We must address our personal information appropriately because the leakage of such per-
sonal information might lead to the infringement of our privacy. If the personal information
of an individual is exposed on the Internet, the information is known to a number of peo-
ple. The information might be also used to fraudulent actions. In addition, in recent years,
there exists a social trend where any trifling personal information is not disclosed. Therefore,
technologies for protecting personal information are strongly required.
The purpose of our research is to develop technologies for protecting personal infor-
mation. First of all, in order to give a better understanding of technologies necessary for
preventing the misuse and the leakage of personal information, we consider the life-cycle,
the requirements, and the protection methods of personal information when an individual
requests and receives a service from a service provider, which is shown in Table 1.1 [1, 2].
From Table 1.1, the life-cycle of personal information consists of the following four phases:
collection, practical use, preservation, and disposition. First, in the collection phase, the ser-
vice provider receives the personal information of the individual necessary for receiving a
service. Second, in the practical use phase, the provider provides a requested service. The
1
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provider also uses the personal information on the intended use. Third, in the preservation
phase, the provider manages the given personal information adequately. Finally, in the dis-
position phase, the provider disposes the given personal information.
In the first and second phases, since it communicates between an individual and a service
provider, secure communication technologies based on the confidential level of a requested
service are needed. Among secure communication methods, anonymous communication is
a communication method where confidentiality is of the highest concern. In the third and
final phases, since personal information is managed in a service provider, the provider needs
to treat personal information accurately and appropriately in order to prevent information
leakage from the inside of the provider. One of the most eective methods for preventing
information leakage is to introduce an access control system. Therefore, in this dissertation,
we focus on the following two topics: 1) access control; 2) anonymous communication.
Access Control An access control system permits accesses from proper users and rejects
accesses from improper users. The use of access control systems enables a provider to treat
personal information accurately and appropriately. Access control systems include access
rights management systems and network admission control systems.
In order to prevent information leakage, it is very important to establish the rules of
access control systems appropriately. As shown in Fig. 1.1, the appropriate establishment
of access control systems is eective to prevent the information leakage. The reason why it
is eective is that the establishment mistakes such as administration errors and operational
errors account for a higher percentage of the causes of information leakage than attacks
from the outside of the organization such as worms/viruses and bugs/security holes without
physical causes such as losses/misplaces and thefts. Accordingly, it is desirable to develop
techniques for managing access control systems, in particular, access rights management
systems adequately. We aim at realizing policy integration by which administrators can
unify management of access rights management systems.
Anonymous Communication Anonymous communication not only protects the content
of a message but also protects the sender and the receiver of the message. Anonymous
communication also serves as a foundation in other anonymous technologies such as anony-
mous authorization and anonymous ID. Anonymous communication is important because it
Table 1.1: Life-cycle, requirements, and protection methods of personal information [1].
Life-cycle Requirement Protection method
Collection Security and anonymity of network Secure communication
Practical use Security and anonymity of network Secure communication
Preservation Protection of leakage Access control system
Disposition Protection of retrieval Erasion of information
3Figure 1.1: Ratio of leaks by cause (Published by Survey Report of Information Security
Incident 2007).
provides higher confidentiality than other secure communication technologies such as en-
cryption communication. Although encryption communication represented by TSL/SSL and
ID authorization is used commonly all over the world, encryption communication exposes
facts that an individual uses a service. Suppose that an individual consults his medical treat-
ment for medical sta by using SSL or E-mail. In this case, the individual cannot consult
anonymously because the medical sta can know who communicates by investigating the
header of a IP packet or his mail address. Thus technologies for achieving anonymity on the
Internet are needed.
In this dissertation, we develop policy integration and anonymous communication for
protecting personal information. Administrators can decrease their time and eort because
policy integration enables them to unify management of access rights management systems.
This technique decreases administration errors and operational errors which remain impor-
tant causes of information leakage as indicated in Fig 1.1. We also focus on an anonymous
communication system called 3-Mode Net (3MN) [3]. Compared to the existing anony-
mous communication systems Crowds [4] and Onion Routing [5], 3MN provides receiver
anonymity unlike Crowds and the number of encryption in 3MN is smaller than Onion Rout-
ing. Although 3MN is superior to Onion Routing and Crowds, 3MN has not been analyzed in
detail, and thus, it is dicult to decide the parameters of 3MN from required performances.
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In our research, we investigate the impacts of the parameters of 3MN on the performance of
3MN.
The outline of the dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, we present an overview of
two personal protection technologies, policy integration and anonymous communication.
We also describe the characteristics of our approaches, comparing them with related work
in these research areas. Chapter 3 describes our framework of policy integration for unify-
ing management of various access rights management systems. In particular, we present a
method for integrating inheritance relations of access rights for integrated policy generation.
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we analyze the performance of an anonymous communication
system called 3-Mode Net. In Chapter 4, we investigate the number of relay nodes and
the number of encryption required for communication. In Chapter 5, we evaluate sender
anonymity against collaborating nodes who collude with each other in order to identify a
message sender. Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation, and presents future research direc-
tions.
Chapter 2
Technologies for Protecting Personal
Information
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we describe two technologies for protecting personal information, policy
integration and anonymous communication, which we focus on in the dissertation. We de-
scribe the framework of policy integration with inheritance relations of access rights and
an overview of an anonymous communication system named 3-Mode Net (3MN). We first
present the problems of related work in the research area of policy integration, and clarify
the characteristics of our approach. We then discuss several issues on 3MN.
2.2 Policy Integration Framework
With the increase and distribution of information, data security and privacy are critical issues.
System administrators pay much attention on prevention of information leakage caused by
fraudulent actions and mis-operations, and introduce access rights management systems to
establish access control policies for various applications and file systems.
Since each access rights management system has its own access control policy, admin-
istrators have to configure policies individually in all systems. Therefore, in order to elimi-
nate inappropriate policies, techniques which treat policies in each system appropriately are
strongly required.
Policy integration is one of the access rights management/establishment techniques which
prevent information leakage caused by fraudulent actions and mis-operations. A classifica-
tion map about access rights management/establishment techniques is shown in Fig. 2.1.
Techniques for preventing information leakage are as follows: policy refinement, policy
integration, and policy conflict detection/resolution. Policy refinement is a technique for
deriving specific policies from abstract policies. A specific policy indicates a policy estab-
5
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Policy in high level
Policy in high level
Policy in low level
Policy in low level
Integrated policy
Integrated policy
Policy
Policy
Policy
Policy
Policy Refinement
Policy Integration
Policy
Policy
Each system
Policy Integration System
Policy Conflict Detection/Resolution
Policy
Policy
Language
Model
Abstract policy
Specific po icy
Figure 2.1: Access rights management technologies.
lished for systems in practice, whereas an abstract policy indicates a policy specified in a
guideline. The detail of this technique has been discussed in [6, 7, 8]. Policy integration
is a technique which unifies management of policies of various access rights management
systems. Policy conflict detection/resolution is a technique which detects the conflict and the
mis-establishment of policies and changes such inappropriate policies to appropriate poli-
cies. The detail of this technique has been discussed in [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
Policy integration and policy conflict detection/resolution are crucial in order to prevent
the establishment of incorrect policies in each system. A couple of methods on policy conflict
detection/resolution are developed by Kamoda et al. [11, 12, 13]. In this research, we limit
our attention on a policy integration technique.
Policy integration is useful for adequately managing each access rights management sys-
tem with small eort and time. Suppose that the personal information protection law and
the security guideline of organizations are changed. In this case, administrators have to pay
enormous attention for updating every policy for each system because each system is in-
dependent each other. Thus, they can unify management of each system without excessive
eort by introducing a policy integration system.
In what follows, we describe policy integration in detail and consider required conditions
by comparing with related work.
2.2. POLICY INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK 7
2.2.1 Preliminary
We introduce very important notions of our research, that is, an access control policy and
inheritance relations of access rights.
Access control policy In policy specification languages, e.g., eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML) [15, 16] and Ponder [17], every access control rule is essen-
tially specified by three elements: subject, resource, and action. Subjects are the entities
that can perform actions in systems (e.g., users, computers). Resources are the entities that
contain or receive information for which access is requested (e.g., files, devices). Actions
are the types of access that is being requested (e.g., edit, copy, read, write).
Using these elements, administrators establish each access control rule called access
control policy or policy for each system. A policy is represented as “a subject can or cannot
perform an action for a resource”. Examples of policies are as follows: everyone can read
public documents; administrators can edit a document.
Inheritance relations of access rights An inheritance relation of access rights is a partial
order relation between the attributes and behaviors of objects, whereby the senior attributes
and behaviors of objects acquire the permissions of their juniors, and thus, the access rights
of their juniors are inherited to the seniors. For example, suppose that there exist the group
of general users and the group of system administrators. In this case, since the group of the
administrators is superior to the group of general users, the group of the administrators can
read a document when the group of the general users can read the document.
The use of inheritance relations of access rights prevents administrators from establishing
inappropriate policies. In the above example, when there exists a policy where the group
of general users can read a document, administrators need to establish a policy where the
group of administrators can read the document from the inheritance relations. That is, it is
shown that they must not establish a policy where the group of administrators cannot read
the document from the inheritance relations.
Inheritance relations are introduced in various access rights management systems, e.g.,
Microsoft Windows R Rights Management Services (RMS) [18] for OFFICE documents and
Adobe R LiveCycleTM Rights Management ES [19] for PDF documents. In many practical
situations, such inheritance relations of access rights are found in subject, resource, and
action categories.
2.2.2 Overview of Policy Integration with Inheritance Relations
Policy integration is a technique which unifies management of access rights management
systems. Policy integration is divided into two classes: integration of policies in each sys-
tem; generation of integrated policies by using inheritance relations. We describe only the
framework of integrated policy generation because the policy integration in the former case
is within the scope of policy conflict detection/resolution.
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Each system
Policy integration system
Integration of
inheritance relations
Generation of 
integrated policies
Inheritance
relations
Policies
Translator
System
administrator
Figure 2.2: Framework of policy integration by using inheritance relations of access rights.
The framework of integrated policy generation with inheritance relations is shown in
Fig. 2.2. A policy integration system first extracts inheritance relations of access rights
from each system. Note that inheritance relations in dierent systems may be specified in
dierent languages. Therefore inheritance relations are translated to the language used in the
policy integration system through translators. These translators are also used for translating
integrated policies to the language used in each system when the integrated policies are
generated. A procedure of the generation of integrated policies is as follows:
1. Integrate inheritance relations in each system.
2. Establish some fundamental policies manually and generate related policies automati-
cally by referring to integrated inheritance relations.
In the latter process, policies which relate the fundamental policies can be created easily by
using inheritance relations. The important issues in this research are as follows:
1. What kind of inheritance relations is treated?
2. How inheritance relations are integrated?
2.2.3 Issues on Policy Integration with Inheritance Relations
Regarding policy integration frameworks, several methods have been proposed [9, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. Among them, in [20], [21], [22], and [26], policy generation frameworks
by integrating inheritance relations of access rights are considered.
For the integration of inheritance relations of dierent systems, Gong et al. discuss com-
plexity, composability, and conditions for integration [21]. In [22], Dawson et al. consider
2.3. ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 9
Table 2.1: Requirements for policy integration.
P. Bonattie [20] S. Dawson [22] M. Sugano [26]
Automatic integration Yes No No
Three categories No No Yes
Easily implementable Yes No No
Versatility Yes Yes No
the conditions for which integrated inheritance relations do not include conflicts of inheri-
tance relations and redundant inheritance relations. Although these two works clarify the re-
quirements for integrating inheritance relations, they oer no specific method for generating
integrated inheritance relations. In contrast with these two works, Bonatti et al. propose an
algorithm for generating integrated inheritance relations [20]. In their work, they introduce
a graph-theoretic approach and derive a logic programming-based algorithm for integrating
inheritance relations. Their algorithm, however, seems rather complicated and is not easily
implementable. Another drawback of the above three works is that they only deal with inher-
itance relations in a single category. Unlike the above works, Sugano et al. propose a policy
integration framework called PolicyComputingTM which treats inheritance relations in three
categories [26]. Their method, however, does not create inheritance relations automatically
because they integrate inheritance relations manually.
In this dissertation, we develop the framework of policy integration with inheritance
relations satisfying the following four requirements:
1. Inheritance relations are integrated automatically.
2. The framework can deal with inheritance relations in three categories.
3. The integration algorithm is easily implementable.
4. The number of systems and the number of inheritance relations are arbitrary (versatil-
ity).
The four requirements discussed in the works are listed in Table 2.1. Although there exist
works which satisfy requirements partially, no work satisfies all requirements. We point out
that the novelty of our research is to develop a policy integration framework which satisfies
the above four requirements.
2.3 Anonymous Communication System
Achieving anonymity of communications on the Internet is one of the most important issues
in communication engineering. In a communication, encryption protocols protect the con-
tent of a message. They do not, however, hide the identities of a sender and a receiver of
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Figure 2.3: General framework of anonymous communications systems.
the message because one can easily get their IP addresses from the header of its IP packet.
Once their identities are revealed, one can easily infer sender’s preferences and human re-
lationships between the sender and the receiver. Therefore, a communication method for
protecting the addresses of senders and receivers is strongly required.
Anonymous communication systems not only protect the content of a message but also
protect the addresses of the sender and the receiver of the message. In general, an anonymous
communication system is regarded as a communication system as shown in Fig. 2.3, which
forwards a data set from the sender to the receiver through several relay nodes, where we
refer to the data set as the set of data composed of the address of the next destination and
encrypted data. Since sender anonymity and receiver anonymity depend on the ways of
forwarding and creating of a data set, several anonymous communication systems have been
proposed [4, 5, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35], and they can be applied to several services,
such as electronic vote systems [28], web access systems [36, 37], e-mail systems [38], and
P2P softwares [39].
Recently, a new anonymous communication system called 3-Mode Net (3MN) has been
proposed [3, 40]. 3MN can be regarded as an extension of Crowds-based anonymous com-
munication systems [4, 41]. As shown in Table 2.2, 3MN has two advantages compared to
the two famous anonymous communication systems Crowds and Onion Routing: first, 3MN
Table 2.2: Characteristics among Onion Routing, Crowds, and 3-Mode Net.
Onion Routing [5] Crowds [4] 3-Mode Net [3]
Sender anonymity Yes Yes Yes
Receiver anonymity Yes No Yes
Number of encryption Large None Small
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Figure 2.4: Actions of a node in 3-Mode Net.
provides anonymity to the proper receiver unlike Crowds; second, as shown in [3], 3MN has
an advantage of the smaller number of encryption than Onion Routing-based anonymous
communication systems [5, 33, 42, 43].
2.3.1 Overview of 3-Mode Net
We proceed to describe an overview of 3-Mode Net which we focus on in this dissertation.
a) Three modes in 3-Mode Net
3MN has three modes as shown in Fig. 2.4, i.e., Decryption Mode (D-Mode), Transmission
Mode (T-Mode), and Encryption Mode (E-Mode). Each relay node chooses one of the three
modes randomly with predefined probabilities.
In Fig. 2.4, the first mode is the mode where a node transmits a received data set to its
destination directly. In this case, the destination node that receives the data set decrypts it
with the decryption key of the destination node, and produces a new data set, which is similar
to the case of Onion Routing [5]. This mode is called Decryption Mode (D-Mode).
The second mode is the mode where a node forwards a received data set to a node other
than the destination node. This mode is called Transmission Mode (T-Mode).
The third mode consists of the following two processes: 1) create a new data set whose
destination is a newly-chosen node except for the destination of a received data set and whose
data is created by encryption of the received data set with the public key of the newly-chosen
node; 2) forward the new data set to another node except for the destination of the new data
set. This mode is called Encryption Mode (E-Mode).
Because of the existence of E-Mode, the destination of a data set does not always indicate
the proper receiver of a message, and thus, 3MN guarantees receiver anonymity. This makes
sharp contrast with the case of Crowds [4, 41]. In addition, sender anonymity is provided
because each node cannot understand whether the immediate predecessor of the node is the
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Figure 2.5: An example of the behavior of 3-Mode Net.
proper sender of a message or one of the relay nodes. This is similar to the cases of Onion
Routing and Crowds.
Each relay node chooses one of the three modes randomly with predefined probabili-
ties. Let pD, pT, and pE denote the probabilities to choose D-Mode, T-Mode, and E-Mode,
respectively, where pD + pT + pE = 1.
b) Behavior of 3-Mode Net
We describe the behavior of 3MN with Fig. 2.5, where each square frame indicates a data set
composed of a multiple-encrypted message and the addresses of the next destinations. The
letters on square frames indicate the next destinations.
Sender S first prepares a data set RjjKR(msg) which consists of the address of a proper
receiver R and an encrypted message KR(msg) with R’s public key KR (jj represents the
combination of data). Next, S creates a data set AjjKA(RjjKR(msg)) (A and KA represent
the destination of a node chosen randomly and A’s public key, respectively). After that, S
forwards the data set AjjKA(RjjKR(msg)) to another node B. In this case, the initial number of
the multiplicity of encryption is equal to two. We denote the initial multiplicity of encryption
by k.
When a relay node has received a data set, the node first checks its destination. If the des-
tination corresponds to the node, the node decrypts the multiple-encrypted data set, produces
a new data set, and chooses one mode randomly with predefined probabilities. Otherwise,
the node only chooses one mode randomly with predefined probabilities. In this example, B
chooses D-Mode. Thus B forwards the received data set to node A.
When node A receives the data set, A can obtain a new data set RjjKR(msg) by decrypting
it. After that, A chooses T-Mode and forwards RjjKR(msg) to another node C.
In a similar fashion, node C and the following nodes forward a data set with encryption
and decryption by choosing one of three modes. Finally, the proper receiver R receives a
data set RjjKR(msg). Then, R acquires the message msg by decrypting the received data set,
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Table 2.3: Relationships among Onion Routing, Crowds, and 3-Mode Net.
Initial
multiplicity
Probability of mode selections
D-Mode E-Mode T-Mode
3-Mode Net k pD pE pT
Onion Routing k 1 0 0
Crowds 1 1   p f 0 p f
and the transmission of the message finishes.
Note that 3MN provides a unified framework which can deal with Onion Routing and
Crowds as special cases by selecting the probabilities of three modes and the initial multi-
plicity of encryption appropriately. The relationships among Onion Routing, Crowds, and
3MN are shown in Table 2.3, where p f represents the probability of forwarding a received
encrypted message to another node in Crowds [4, 41].
2.3.2 Issues on 3-Mode Net
As stated in [3], 3MN is an anonymous communication system which provides sender
anonymity and receiver anonymity with a small number of encryption; however, there exist
several issues on 3MN, which we discuss in this subsection.
3MN has not been analyzed from the viewpoint of performance. Although the expecta-
tions of the number of relay nodes and the number of encryption are derived in [3], the other
important factors such as their probability distributions and their variances have not been de-
rived. As a result, we do not understand the impacts of the probabilities of mode selections
and the initial multiplicity of encryption on the behavior of 3MN. In this dissertation, we
analyze the number of relay nodes and the number of encryption.
Sender anonymity and receiver anonymity in 3MN are discussed qualitatively in [3].
Unfortunately, it is not shown that to what extent anonymity is guaranteed for senders and
receivers when the probabilities of mode selections and the initial multiplicity of encryption
are given. Attackers may reveal senders and receivers with high probability if the proba-
bilities of mode selections are chosen inappropriately. Intuitively, when both the number
of relay nodes and the number of encryption are quite small, anonymity would be low. In
order to evaluate the performance of 3-Mode Net, it is a crucial issue to clarify the eects
of the probabilities of mode selections on sender anonymity and receiver anonymity. In this
dissertation, we evaluate anonymity in 3MN, in particular, sender anonymity in 3MN.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented policy integration and anonymous communication as tech-
nologies for protecting personal information. In policy integration, we have defined a policy
and inheritance relations of access rights, and have described a framework for generating
integrated policies by using inheritance relations. Furthermore, we have clarified the char-
acteristics of our approach by comparing with related work in the research area of policy
integration. Our detailed framework of policy integration with inheritance relations will be
described in Chapter 3.
We have also discussed anonymous communication, focusing on a system named 3-Mode
Net. We have described the framework, the characteristics of 3MN, and the performance
analysis of 3MN in terms of the number of relay nodes, the number of encryption, and
sender anonymity.
Chapter 3
Policy Integration Algorithm with
Inheritance Relations of Access Rights
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we show a policy integration framework for unifying management of vari-
ous access rights management systems. A procedure for generating integrated policies is as
follows; first, integrate inheritance relations of access rights in each system; second, estab-
lish fundamental policies by administrators and generate related policies automatically by
referring to the integrated inheritance relations.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the method for generating integrated inheritance relations is
crucial. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an algorithm for integrating inheri-
tance relations of access rights, which satisfies the four requirements presented in Chapter 2:
Inheritance relations are integrated automatically; the framework can deal with inheritance
relations in three categories; the integration algorithm is easily implementable; the number
of systems and the number of inheritance relations are arbitrary.
A procedure for generating integrated policies of access rights management systems is
as follows: first, integrate inheritance relations in a single category; second, integrate inheri-
tance relations of all categories; third, establish fundamental policies by administrators, and
generate related policies automatically by referring to the integrated inheritance relations.
The first and the second steps generate integrated inheritance relations, and we show that
these operations can be accomplished by matrix operations. The derivation of the algorithm
is based on a graph-theoretic approach, where a useful property of adjacency matrices is ex-
ploited. Further, it is shown that the elimination of conflicts and the removal of redundant
inheritance relations are carried out by matrix operations. This chapter is related to the work
published in [44, 45].
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Figure 3.1: Procedure for policy integration.
3.2 Procedure for Generating Integrated Policies
This section presents our policy integration framework briefly, and clarifies the purpose of
this chapter. We illustrate our procedure for policy integration, which is shown in Fig 3.1.
The procedure of our policy integration is as follows:
1. Integrate inheritance relations of all systems for each category.
2. Integrate three integrated inheritance relations of each category into one integrated
inheritance relation.
3. Establish some fundamental policies manually.
4. Generate related policies automatically by referring to the integrated inheritance rela-
tion.
5. Output these policies by using a policy specification language such as XACML [15].
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As discussed in Chapter 2, what kind of inheritance relations is treated and how inheritance
relations are integrated are very important. We focus on the first and the second processes
for integrating inheritance relations of access rights.
The first step integrates inheritance relations in a single category. The method for this
step is shown in Section 3.5.2, where some basic results of graph theory and some matrix
operations are applied. This step allows us to obtain three integrated inheritance relations for
action, subject, and resource categories.
The second step integrates the above three integrated inheritance relations into one in-
tegrated inheritance relation. The method for this step is shown in Section 3.5.3, where we
show that the inheritance relations in dierent categories can be integrated with Kronecker
sum.
Note that when dierent names are assigned to the same action in dierent access rights
management systems, we need to unify them. For example, in system A, “Read” is assigned
to a certain action, and in system B, “Show” is assigned to the same action. In this case, we
have to use the same name (“Read” or “Show”) for the same action in both systems. This
unification is accomplished by translators, which is shown in Fig. 2.2 of Chapter 2.
In what follows, we discuss our algorithm for integrating inheritance relations of access
rights. First, we discuss inheritance relations of access rights in detail.
3.3 Inheritance Relations of Access Rights
As discussed in Chapter 2, in many practical situations, we can find inheritance relations
of access rights in each category, that is, subject category, resource category, and action
category. Examples of inheritance relations in subject, resource, and action categories are
shown in Fig. 3.2 (a), Fig. 3.2 (b), and Fig. 3.2 (c), respectively.
Staff
Manager
Director
(a) Subject category.
Confidential
document
Public
document
(b) Resource category.
Edit
Copy Save Print
Show
(c) Action category.
Figure 3.2: Examples of inheritance relations of access rights.
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In Fig. 3.2 (a), the arrow directed from “Sta” to “Manager” represents that if sta can
perform an action on a resource, managers can perform the same action on the resource.
Similarly, the arrow from “Confidential document” to “Public document” in Fig. 3.2 (b)
indicates that when a subject can perform an action on confidential documents, the subject
can perform the same action on public documents. In the same way, the arrow from “Edit”
to “Copy” in Fig. 3.2 (c) implies that if a subject can edit a resource, the subject can also
copy the resource.
In general, an inheritance relation is described by the following statement: if a subject si
can perform an action am on a resource rh, a subject s j can perform an action an on a resource
rl. We express this statement as (si; rh; am) ! (s j; rl; an). As shown in Fig. 3.2, we focus on
inheritance relations described in a single category. Therefore, we only deal with inheritance
relations expressed by the following forms:
inheritance relations in subject category:
(si; rh; am) ! (s j; rh; am) (8rh 2 res;8am 2 act);
inheritance relations in resource category:
(si; rh; am) ! (si; rl; am) (8si 2 sub;8am 2 act);
inheritance relations in action category:
(si; rh; am) ! (si; rh; an) (8si 2 sub;8rh 2 res);
where res, act, and sub represent the sets of resources, actions, and subjects, respectively.
In the first expression, access rights for subject si are inherited to subject s j regardless of
resources and actions. In this case, we simply denote this inheritance relation by si ! s j,
and we say that the inheritance relation is independent from resource and action categories.
The independence of inheritance relation in resource category and that in action category are
similarly defined, and we use notations rh ! rl and am ! an for those relations. Throughout
this chapter, we assume that all inheritance relations in each category are independent from
other categories.
3.4 Overview of the Integration of Inheritance Relations
As shown in Fig. 3.2, inheritance relations are expressed by directed graphs. First, we
introduce some notions in graph theory [46, 47] to express inheritance relations.
A directed graph G(V; E) consists of a set of vertices denoted by V , and a set of edges
denoted by E. An edge e = (v; u) in E is an ordered pair of two dierent vertices v and u
in V , where v and u are called initial and terminal vertices of the edge e, respectively. An
edge is called a loop if its initial vertex and terminal vertex are the same. We only deal
with directed graphs without any loops throughout the chapter. A path in a directed graph is
defined as a finite sequence e1e2 : : : en of edges where the terminal vertex of each intermediate
3.4. OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATION OF INHERITANCE RELATIONS 19
edge coincides with the initial vertex of the succeeding edge, and we refer to the number of
edges as the length of the path. A path e1e2 : : : en is called a circuit if the initial vertex of e1
coincides with the terminal vertex of en.
3.4.1 Integration of Inheritance Relations in a Single Category
We only integrate inheritance relations in action category for all access rights management
systems because the integration of inheritance relations in subject and resource categories is
performed in a similar manner. As stated in Chapter 2, the integration of inheritance relations
is accomplished as follows: first, integrate inheritance relations for each category; second,
integrate inheritance relations for three categories. We assume that all inheritance relations
in each category are independent from other categories. In this subsection, we only deal with
inheritance relations such as am ! an, and do not consider general inheritance relations such
as (si; rh; am) ! (s j; rl; an).
a) Basic Operation for Integration
We provide a method for integrating inheritance relations in action category by using graphs.
The integration in subject and resource categories is carried out in a similar manner.
Let Gh(ACTh; IRACTh ) denote a graph which represents inheritance relations in action cat-
egory of system h (h 2 f1; : : : ; Hg), where ACTh denotes a set of vertices representing actions
of system h, and IRACTh denotes a set of edges representing inheritance relations between pairs
of actions of system h. A basic operation for integrating inheritance relations is an operation
taking the union of these inheritance relations:
ACT = ACT1 [ ACT2 [    [ ACTH; (3.1)
IRACT = IRACT1 [ IRACT2 [    [ IRACTH ; (3.2)
where ACT denotes a set of actions of the integrated system, and IRACT denotes a set of
inheritance relations between pairs of actions of the integrated system. This allows us to
obtain the graph which represents integrated inheritance relations of the integrated system as
G(ACT; IRACT).
Remark 3.1 Inheritance relations generated by taking the union of inheritance relations
have a major role in the prevention of the establishment of improper policies in each system.
As discussed in Section 2.2 and Section 3.2, inheritance relations are used for the generation
of appropriate policies. Inheritance relations generated by this basic operation also contain
all elements of inheritance relations of each system, and thus, they are applicable for each
system. Consequently, we can establish appropriate policies for each system by using in-
heritance relations which are generated by taking the union of inheritance relations in each
system.
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Remark 3.2 One may consider an operation taking the intersection of inheritance relations
in each system as a basic operation. This operation, however, does not fit our purpose which
is presented in Section 2.2. The reason is that inheritance relations obtained by this operation
consist of common parts of inheritance relations of each system and we only generate policies
about the common parts even if we use them.
However, the above simple operation may cause problems due to the existence of circuits
and redundant edges [22]. In the following, we discuss those problems, and provide a way
to resolve these problems.
b) Circuits
An example of a circuit in action category is shown in Fig. 3.3 (a). In this example, the
actions “Edit”, “Save”, and “Print” are cyclically dependent. Thus, if the “Edit” action is
permitted to a subject on a resource, the “Save” and “Print” actions are also permitted to the
subject on the resource.
The problem due to circuits caused by the integration of inheritance relations of all access
rights management systems is that the integration yields conflicts between the integrated in-
heritance relations and the inheritance relations of some access rights management systems.
When circuits are generated, there are two dierent ways to cope with this problem:
 If administrators think that the conflicts will cause serious problems, stop the integra-
tion.
 If administrators think that the problems caused by the conflicts are not serious, con-
tinue the integration.
In the latter case, we unify cyclically dependent actions as a single set of actions, and elim-
inate the circuit. The methods for the detection and the elimination of circuits will be pre-
sented in Section 3.5.2, where it is shown that they can be accomplished by some basic
matrix operations.
Remark 3.3 In general, to determine whether the above conflicts are serious or not is a
dicult task because it depends on the situation. One of way of this determination is to refer
to the security guidelines of the organization. If the integrated inheritance relations contra-
dict their security guideline, we must stop the integration. Otherwise, we unify cyclically
dependent inheritance relations.
c) Redundancy
First, we give the definition of a redundant edge.
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Edit
Save Print
(a) A circuit.
Copy Save Print
Show
Edit
(b) A redundant edge.
Figure 3.3: Examples of a circuit and a redundant edge.
Definition 3.1 Let V = fv1; v2; : : : ; vng denote a set of vertices in a directed graph without
circuits. We denote an edge directed from vi to v j by ei j. The edge ei j is redundant if there
exists another path directed from vi to v j.
An example of a redundant edge is shown in Fig. 3.3 (b), where a redundant edge is denoted
by a dashed arrow.
Inheritance relations represented by redundant edges are not necessary to be integrated
because such relationships can be obtained by tracing the corresponding paths. Therefore
we detect and remove all redundant edges. The procedures for the detection and the removal
of redundant edges using basic matrix operations are given in Section 3.5.2.
Summarizing this subsection, the integration of inheritance relations in a single category
can be accomplished by the following steps:
1. Take a union of inheritance relations of all systems.
2. Detect and eliminate circuits by unifying cyclically dependent inheritance relations.
3. Detect and remove redundant edges.
3.4.2 Integration of Inheritance Relations of Dierent Categories
In this subsection, we present a basic idea for integrating inheritance relations of dierent
categories through a simple example. A general method using adjacency matrices will be
presented in Section 3.5.3.
We describe the reason why inheritance relations of dierence categories are integrated.
For example, there exist the inheritance relations shown in Fig. 3.2 and a policy where sta
can edit confidential documents. In this case, we easily obtain two policies where directors
can edit confidential documents and sta can copy confidential documents. It is, however,
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dicult to judge whether a policy where managers can show public documents is appropriate
or not because the inheritance relations are not related to each other. Therefore, in order
to associate inheritance relations of dierent categories, we need to integrate inheritance
relations of dierent categories.
We consider the integration of inheritance relations of subject, resource, and action cate-
gories given by graphs GS(VS; ES), GR(VR; ER), and GA(VA; EA), respectively, where
VS = fs1; s2g; VR = fr1; r2g; VA = fa1; a2g;
ES = fs1 ! s2g; ER = fr1 ! r2g; EA = fa1 ! a2g:
First, we integrate inheritance relations of resource and action categories. By the inher-
itance relations r1 ! r2 and a1 ! a2, and from the assumption that inheritance relations
are independent from other categories, the integrated inheritance relations are obtained as
follows:
(si; r1; a1) ! (si; r1; a2); (si; r2; a1) ! (si; r2; a2);
(si; r1; a1) ! (si; r2; a1); (si; r1; a2) ! (si; r2; a2) (i = 1; 2): (3.3)
For simplicity, we rewrite the above relations as r1a1 ! r1a2, r2a1 ! r2a2, r1a1 ! r2a1,
r1a2 ! r2a2, respectively. It then follows that these inheritance relations can be regarded as
the edges of the graph defined on the vertex set fr1a1; r1a2; r2a1; r2a2g.
Next, we integrate the inheritance relation s1 ! s2 in subject category and the inheritance
relations given by Eq. (3.3). Since Eq. (3.3) holds for i = 1; 2, we obtain the following eight
inheritance relations:
s1r1a1 ! s1r1a2; s1r2a1 ! s1r2a2; s1r1a1 ! s1r2a1; s1r1a2 ! s1r2a2;
s2r1a1 ! s2r1a2; s2r2a1 ! s2r2a2; s2r1a1 ! s2r2a1; s2r1a2 ! s2r2a2; (3.4)
where sirham is an abbreviation of (si; rh; am). In addition, the access rights for s1 are inher-
ited to s2 whatever resources and actions may be, because inheritance relations in subject
category are independent from action and resource categories. As a result, we obtain four
inheritance relations as
s1r1a1 ! s2r1a1; s1r1a2 ! s2r1a2; s1r2a1 ! s2r2a1; s1r2a2 ! s2r2a2: (3.5)
It then follows that the graph representing the integrated inheritance relations of action and
resource categories is composed of the set of edges given by Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5), and the set
of vertices fs1r1a1; s1r1a2; s1r2a1; s1r2a2; s2r1a1; s2r1a2; s2r2a1; s2r2a2g.
As shown above, the integration of inheritance relations of dierent categories is too
complicated to implement even for the above simple case. In Section 3.5.3, we present a
general procedure for integrating inheritance relations of dierent categories, and show that
the procedure can be implemented easily by using adjacency matrices.
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3.5 Integration of Inheritance Relations Using Adjacency
Matrices
We present a matrix-based algorithm for integrating inheritance relations in a single category,
as well as a method for integrating inheritance relations of all categories. The expression of
graphs via adjacency matrices plays a crucial role.
3.5.1 Adjacency Matrices and Their Properties
We first provide the definition of adjacency matrices, as well as the definitions of summation
and multiplication of matrices. We also introduce a useful property of adjacency matrices.
Definition 3.2 Let G denote a directed graph with a vertex set V = fv1; v2; : : : ; vng. The
adjacency matrix A of the graph G is defined as A = [ai j] (i = 1; : : : ; n; j = 1; : : : n) where
each element ai j is given by
ai j =
(
1 (if there is an edge from vi to v j);
0 (otherwise): (3.6)
Summation and multiplication of adjacency matrices are the same as usual matrix oper-
ations except for the elementwise summation.
Definition 3.3 Sum of elements a and b is defined as the logical sum, that is,
a + b =
(
0 (a = b = 0);
1 (otherwise): (3.7)
The following lemma concerns the condition for the existence of a path connecting two
vertices, and is exploited for detecting circuits and redundant edges.
Lemma 3.1 ([46, 47]) Let A denote an adjacency matrix of a directed graph G whose vertex
set is given by V = fv1; v2; : : : ; vng. Then, there exists a path of length p directed from vi to v j
if and only if the (i; j)th element of Ap is equal to 1.
Remark 3.4 As mentioned in Section 3.4, we only deal with a directed graph without loops.
Thus diagonal elements of adjacency matrices of directed graphs are equal to 0.
3.5.2 Integration in a Single Category Using Adjacency Matrices
We give a matrix-based method for integrating inheritance relations in a single category.
Although we derive the method for action category, the method can be applied to other
categories in a similar way.
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Let H denote the number of systems, and inheritance relations in action category of
system h are represented by the graph Gh(ACTh; IRACTh ) (h = 1; : : : ; H). In integrating these
inheritance relations, the size of the corresponding adjacency matrices of all systems must be
the same because matrix operations include matrix summation. Therefore, we first rewrite
graphs by replacing the vertex set ACTh by ACT given by Eq. (3.1).
In the following, we give a matrix-based algorithm for the integration according to the
procedure at the end of Section 3.4.1.
a) The First Operation : Taking a Union
The first operation is to take a union of inheritance relations. This is accomplished by adding
each adjacency matrix corresponding to inheritance relations of each system. Let Ah denote
an adjacency matrix representing inheritance relations in action category of system h. Then,
the adjacency matrix A corresponding to the integrated inheritance relation in action category
is given by
A = A1 + A2 +    + AH: (3.8)
b) The Second Operation : Detection and Elimination of Circuits
We can detect and eliminate all circuits by repeated use of the following procedure until all
circuits in the graph are eliminated.
1. Remove all vertices composing a circuit and introduce a new vertex instead.
2. Connect the edges associated with removed vertices to the new vertex.
For this procedure, the following theorems are useful.
Theorem 3.1 Let G denote a directed graph with n vertices and A denote an adjacency
matrix of G. Then, G does not include circuits if and only if An = 0.
Theorem 3.2 Let G denote a directed graph and A denote its adjacency matrix. Then, there
exists a circuit of length l including vi if and only if the (i; i)th element of Al is equal to 1.
These theorems are easily proved with Lemma 3.1, so that they are omitted.
Based on the above two theorems, a procedure is carried out by the following matrix
operations:
Step. 1 Let l = 2.
Step. 2 Compute Al.
Step. 3 If any diagonal elements of Al are equal to 1, at least one circuit exists. In this case,
go to the following steps. Otherwise, go to Step. 4.
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Step. i Choose a vertex vi consisting a circuit. After that, identify the circuit
viv j1v j2 : : : v jl 1vi which includes vi by tracing A; A2; : : : ; Al. Let ci denote
the set of vertices fv j1 ; v j2 ; : : : ; v jl 1g.
Step. ii Replace the i-th column by the logical sum of the columns corresponding
to vertices in ci. After that, replace the i-th row by the logical sum of the
rows corresponding to vertices in ci.
Step. iii Replace the (i; i)th element of A by 0.
Step. iv Remove all columns and rows corresponding to vertices in ci.
Step. v Redefine A as the new generated matrix and return to Step. 1.
Step. 4 If Al = 0, the graph does not include any circuits, and the algorithm is finished.
Otherwise, add 1 to l and return to Step. 2.
The implication of Step. 3 in this algorithm is as follows: In Step. i, a selected vertex is
regarded as a new vertex. Step. ii adds every edge of each vertex in a circuit to the selected
vertex in the circuit. Step. iii removes all loops because we have assumed that every graph
has no loop. Finally, Step. iv removes all the vertices in the circuit except for the selected
vertex.
Remark 3.5 One may think that the graph obtained by the above algorithm depends on the
choice of a vertex in Step. i, and the graph is not determined uniquely. As seen from Step. ii
to Step. iv, however, the graph is uniquely determined whatever a chosen vertex of a circuit
may be, since the newly generated vertex has every edge of each eliminated vertex.
c) The Third Operation : Detection and Removal of Redundant Edges
The following theorem is used for detecting redundant edges, which is derived easily from
Lemma 3.1.
Theorem 3.3 Let G denote a directed graph without circuits and A denote an adjacency
matrix of G. Then, the edge directed from vi to v j is redundant if and only if the (i; j)th
element of Al is equal to 1 for some l  2.
Based on Theorem 3.3, a procedure for detecting and removing redundant edges via
matrix operations is obtained as follows:
Step. 1 Let l = 2.
Step. 2 Compute Al.
Step. 3 If the (i; j)th elements of A and Al are equal to 1, replace the (i; j)th element of A by
0, add 1 to l, and return Step. 2.
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Step. 4 If Al = 0, the graph does not include any redundant edges, and the algorithm is
finished. Otherwise, add 1 to l and return to Step. 2.
We note that Theorem 3.1 ensures that the algorithms for detection and removal of cir-
cuits and redundant edges finish within finite steps. Both algorithms stop when l is equal to
n where n represents the number of vertices in G.
Remark 3.6 The graph obtained by the above algorithm is uniquely determined because the
output of the above algorithm is independent of the choice of vertices in Step 3.
3.5.3 Integration of Inheritance Relations for Dierent Categories Us-
ing Adjacency Matrices
Before presenting a method for integrating inheritance relations of three categories, we
present a method for integrating inheritance relations of two dierent categories using ad-
jacency matrices. Let G(RES; IRRES) and G(ACT; IRACT) denote the graphs associated with
the inheritance relations in subject category and action category, respectively, where RES =
fr1; : : : ; rnRg and ACT = fa1; : : : ; anAg, and the corresponding adjacency matrices denote R
and A, respectively.
We give a method for generating the adjacency matrix XRA representing the integrated
inheritance relations of resource and action categories. As seen from the observation in
Section 4.2, the generated graph representing the integrated inheritance relations of resource
and action categories is defined on the vertex set given by
RES  ACT = fr1a1; : : : ; r1anA ; : : : ; rnRa1; : : : ; rnRanAg:
Accordingly, the order of the adjacency matrix associated with the integrated inheritance
relations of resource and action categories is given by nR  nA.
Note first that the inheritance relations in resource category hold whatever action may
be. Consequently, we obtain the following adjacency matrix XRA1 , which corresponds to the
dashed line of Fig. 3.4:
XRA1 = R 
 InA =
26666666664
r11InA    r1nR InA
:::
: : :
:::
rnR1InA    rnRnR InA
37777777775 ; (3.9)
where ri j is the (i; j)th element of matrix R, InA stands for the identity matrix of order nA, and

 denotes Kronecker product defined as follows: For a matrix X = [xi j] of the size p-by-q
and a matrix Y , the Kronecker product of X and Y is defined as
X 
 Y :=
26666666664
x11Y    x1qY
:::
:::
xp1Y    xpqY
37777777775 : (3.10)
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Note also that inheritance relations in action category hold whatever resource may be.
Thus we obtain the following adjacency matrix XRA2 , which corresponds to the solid line of
Fig. 3.4:
XRA2 = InR 
 A =
26666666664
A 0
: : :
0 A
37777777775 : (3.11)
With Eqs. (3.9) and (3.11), we obtain the adjacency matrix XRA of the integrated inheritance
relations of resource and action categories as follows:
XRA = XRA1 + XRA2 = R 
 InA + InR 
 A: (3.12)
Notice that the right-hand side of Eq. (3.12) is a well-known matrix operation called
Kronecker sum. The Kronecker sum of the matrices X (n  n) and Y (m  m) is defined as
X  Y := X 
 Im + In 
 Y: (3.13)
Summarizing the above, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4 Let R and A denote adjacency matrices representing inheritance relations of
resource category and action category, respectively. Then, the adjacency matrix representing
integrated inheritance relations of these two categories is given by RA, i.e., Kronecker sum
of matrices R and A.
Example 3.1 Consider the integration of inheritance relations of resource and action cate-
gories shown in Fig. 3.4. The adjacency matrix R associated with the inheritance relations
of resource category defined on fa; b; cg, and the adjacency matrix A for the action category
defined on fE;P;Sg are given, respectively by
R =
26666666640 1 10 0 00 0 0
3777777775 ; A =
26666666640 0 10 0 10 0 0
3777777775 : (3.14)
In this case, the integrated inheritance relations are defined on the vertex set
RES  ACT = faE; aP; aS; bE; bP; bS; cE; cP; cSg; (3.15)
and the corresponding XRA1 , XRA2 , and XRA are obtained as follows:
XRA1 =
26666666640 I3 I30 0 00 0 0
3777777775 ; XRA2 =
2666666664A 0 00 A 00 0 A
3777777775 ; XRA =
2666666664A I3 I30 A 00 0 A
3777777775 : (3.16)
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Figure 3.4: An example of Kronecker sum between resource and action categories.
Kronecker sum is also applied to integrating inheritance relations of three categories. Let
S denote the adjacency matrix of the corresponding inheritance relations of subject category.
Then, in a similar way to the above discussion, it is shown that the adjacency matrix XSRA of
the integrated inheritance relations of three categories is given by
XSRA = S  XRA = S  R  A: (3.17)
Using Kronecker sum, we can easily integrate all inheritance relations of three categories.
Remark 3.7 ([48]) In Eq. (3.17), one may think that the right-hand side of the equation
should be S  (R A). However, Eq. (3.17) is correct because Kronecker product is associa-
tive, and thus, Kronecker sum is also associative, that is, (S  R)  A = S  (R  A).
Remark 3.8 The graph obtained by Kronecker sum is uniquely determined. Thus, together
with Remark 3.5 and Remark 3.6, it is concluded that the graph obtained by our algorithm
is uniquely determined.
Here, we have to check whether integrated inheritance relations include circuits or re-
dundant edges. Concerning these points, the following theorems hold:
Theorem 3.5 Let GX and GY denote graphs with adjacency matrices X and Y, respectively.
If GX and GY do not include circuits, the graph associated with the adjacency matrix X  Y
does not include circuits.
Theorem 3.6 Let GX and GY denote graphs with adjacency matrices X and Y, respectively.
If GX and GY do not include circuits and redundant edges, the graph associated with the
adjacency matrix X  Y does not include redundant edges.
3.6. CONCLUSION 29
The proofs of Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.6 are given in Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2,
respectively. Combining the above theorems, the following corollary is obtained:
Corollary 3.1 Let GX and GY denote graphs with adjacency matrices X and Y, respectively.
If both GX and GY include neither circuits nor redundant edges, the graph associated with
the adjacency matrix X  Y includes neither circuits nor redundant edges.
By this corollary, it is assured that the inheritance relations obtained by Kronecker sum have
no circuits and redundant edges provided that inheritance relations of all categories include
no circuits and redundant edges.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have discussed our policy integration framework. In particular, in order
to generate integrated access control policies, we have presented a matrix-based algorithm
for integrating inheritance relations of access rights under the assumption that inheritance
relations in a single category are independent from other categories. By applying our al-
gorithm, we can generate integrated inheritance relations automatically, and the results can
be applied to centralized access rights management systems, such as Microsoft Windows
RMS and Adobe LiveCycle Rights Management ES, where administrators have to prepare
integrated inheritance relations manually in the conventional framework.
One of the most significant problems is that our algorithm will stop if an administrator
thinks that the conflicts caused by the integration yield serious problems. We have to improve
the algorithm so as to preclude inheritance relations which cause conflicts, and to continue
the integration process without such inheritance relations.
Our proposed method will be especially useful for unifying management of access rights
management systems which possess various inheritance relations satisfying the indepen-
dence assumption. We cannot, however, apply the algorithm when we want to set up complex
access control policies which do not satisfy the independence assumption.
In such a situation, the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model [49, 50] will be use-
ful. Using the RBAC model, administrators can establish policies in detail. However, the
RBAC model can deal only with inheritance relations in subject category, and they have to
address resources and actions individually. Therefore, it is desirable to use our method to-
gether with the RBAC model in a mutually complementary manner. In this case, we have
to check whether the policies established by the RBAC model and the policies generated by
our proposed method do not conflict by using policy conflict detection tools [9, 10, 11, 13].

Chapter 4
Analysis of the Number of Relay Nodes
and the Number of Encryption for
Anonymous Communication System
3-Mode Net
4.1 Introduction
In this and next chapters, we analyze the performance of an anonymous communication sys-
tem 3-Mode Net (3MN). In Chapter 4, we analyze the number of relay nodes and the number
of encryption required for communication in 3MN. In particular, we show the probability dis-
tributions, the expectations, and the variances of the above two performance measures. The
formulas are derived from random walk theory, probability generating functions, and their
properties. From these results, we investigate the impacts of the probabilities of mode selec-
tions and the initial multiplicity of encryption on the behavior of 3MN. Using these results,
we give some conditions to avoid such a situation that the number of relay nodes and the
number of encryption become extremely large. This chapter is related to the work published
in [51, 52].
4.2 Modeling of 3-Mode Net by Random Walk
When D-Mode, E-Mode, or T-Mode is chosen in 3MN, the multiplicity of encryption de-
creases by one, increases by one, and remains unchanged, respectively. Accordingly, the
behavior of 3MN can be modeled by a random walk, because the multiplicity of the encryp-
tion of a data set changes in a probabilistic manner. The analysis method by random walk
has been used commonly, and many useful results are known at present [53]. By applying
these useful results, we analyze the number of relay nodes and the number of encryption.
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A random walk is defined as a stochastic process on a set of integers, which starts at the
origin and walks one step to the positive or negative direction with predefined probabilities
independent of its location. As seen from such a viewpoint, the behavior of 3MN is regarded
as the following stochastic process.
Modeling of 3MN with a random walk: Let k denote the initial multiplicity of encryption.
Then, 3MN is regarded as a random walk on the integers which starts at a position k and at
each point, moves one step to the negative direction with probability pD, moves one step to
the positive direction with probability pE, or stays on its position with probability pT. Once
the walk arrives at the origin, i.e., when the multiplicity of encryption is equal to 0, the walk
finishes.
In order to derive the probability distributions of the number of relay nodes and the
number of encryption in the next section, we calculate the total number of all communication
paths until the walk first arrives at 0 from k. The number can be obtained by exploiting the
“first passage time distribution”, which is well known in random walk theory [53].
Lemma 4.1 Let k denote the initial multiplicity of encryption, and d, e, t denote the numbers
of which D-Mode, E-Mode, and T-mode are chosen, respectively (therefore, k = d e). Then,
the total number n of paths which first reach 0 from k is given as follows:
n =
k
d + e + t
(d + e + t)!
d!e!t! : (4.1)
Proof of Lemma 4.1: From the result of the first passage time distribution [53], the total
number nDE of paths which first reach 0 from k after D-Mode and E-Mode are chosen d and
e times, respectively, is as follows:
nDE =
d   e
d + e
(d + e)!
d!e! :
Next, we consider the combination of the above case when D-Mode and E-Mode are
chosen d + e times and the case when T-Mode is chosen t times. Since T-Mode is not chosen
at the last position, the total number of the combination is equal to d+e+t 1Ct. As a result, the
total number n of paths which first reach 0 from k after D-Mode, E-Mode, and T-Mode are
chosen d, e, and t times, respectively, is as follows:
n = d+e+t 1Ct  nDE = d   ed + e + t
(d + e + t)!
d!e!t! : 
4.3 Probability Distributions of the Number of Relay Nodes
and the Number of Encryption
In this section, we derive the probability distributions of the number of relay nodes as well
as the number of encryption. From Lemma 4.1, we can obtain the following theorems which
give the probability distributions of the number of relay nodes and the number of encryption.
We define K as a random variable representing the initial multiplicity of encryption.
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Theorem 4.1 Let N denote a random variable representing the number of relay nodes re-
quired for communication. Then, the probability distribution P(N = r j K = k) is given by
the following equation:
P(N = r j K = k) =
X
t2F(k;r)
k
r
r!
d!e!t! pD
d pEe pTt; (4.2)
where d = (r   t + k)=2, e = (r   t   k)=2, and F(k; r) is a set of integers defined as
F(k; r) = ft j 0 5 t 5 r   k ; t  r   k (mod 2)g:
Theorem 4.2 Let Ne denote a random variable representing the number of encryption re-
quired for communication, that is, the sum of the number of the selection of E-Mode and the
initial multiplicity of encryption. Then, the probability distribution P(Ne = r j K = k) is
given by the following equation:
P(Ne = r j K = k) = k2r   k
(2r   k)!
r!(r   k)!
pDr pE (r k)
(pD + pE)(2r k) : (4.3)
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Suppose that D-Mode, E-Mode, and T-Mode are chosen d, e, and t
times, respectively. The probability of this event until a message reaches the proper receiver
is the product of pDd pEe ptT and the total number of the above event. The total number of this
event is given by Lemma 4.1. Therefore, in order to prove Theorem 4.1, we need to derive
the constraints on d, e, and t.
Since r represents the number of relay nodes required for communication, the following
equations hold: r=d+e+t and k=d e, or equivalently, d= (r t+k)=2 and e= (r t k)=2. Since
d and e are integers, the following condition on t has to be satisfied: t r k (mod 2). The
maximum value of t is also equal to r k because e= 0. Consequently we obtain the above
set F(k; r) on t and Eq. (4.2). 
Proof of Theorem 4.2: Suppose that D-Mode, E-Mode, and T-Mode are chosen d, e, and t
times, respectively. The probability of this event until a message reaches the proper receiver
is the product of pDd pEe ptT and the total number of the above event. The total number of this
event is given by Lemma 4.1. Therefore, in order to prove Theorem 4.2, we need to derive
the constraints on d, e, and t.
Since r represents the number of encryption required for communication, this is the sum
of the number of selection of E-Mode and the initial multiplicity of encryption. This is
equal to the number of selection of D-Mode. Therefore, we obtain two equations e = r   k
and d = r. In addition, t takes all nonnegative integers because the number of selection of
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T-Mode is independent of the number of encryption. As a result, we obtain
P(Ne = r j K = k) =
1X
t=0
k
d + e + t
(d + e + t)!
d!e!t! pD
d pEe pTt
=
k
2r   k
(2r   k)!
r!(r   k)! pD
r pEr k 
1X
t=0
(2r   k + t   1)!
(2r   k   1)!t! pT
t
=
k
2r   k
(2r   k)!
r!(r   k)!
pDr pE (r k)
(pD + pE)(2r k) ;
where we use the following identity:
1X
t=0
(a + t)!
a!t!
xt =
1
(1   x)a+1 : 
4.4 Expectations and Variances of the Number of Relay
Nodes and the Number of Encryption
We show the expectations and the variances of the number N of relay nodes and the number
Ne of encryption in order to consider the impacts of the probabilities of mode selections
and the initial multiplicity of encryption. We derive them by using probability generating
functions and their properties [53].
4.4.1 Probability Generating Functions
Let X denote a nonnegative integer random variable. Then, a probability generating function
gX() is defined as
gX() = E(X) =
1X
r=0
P(X = r)r; (4.4)
where E() is the expectation operator. Using the probability generating function, the expec-
tation E(X) and the variance V(X) of X are obtained as follows [53]:
E(X) = g0X(1); (4.5)
V(X) = g00X(1) + g0X(1)   (g0X(1))2: (4.6)
Therefore, the calculation of the expectations and the variances of the number of relay nodes
and the number of encryption is reduced to the derivation of those probability generating
functions. As for the probability generating functions, the following lemmas are derived:
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Lemma 4.2 Let k denote a random variable representing the number of relay nodes re-
quired for communication under the condition that the initial multiplicity of encryption is k.
Then, the probability generating function for k is given by
gk() =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0BBBBB@1   pT   p(1   pT)2   4pD pE22pE
1CCCCCAk (pE , 0); 
pD
1   pT
!k
(pE = 0):
(4.7)
Lemma 4.3 Let k denote a random variable representing the number of encryption required
for communication under the condition that the initial multiplicity of encryption is k. Then,
the probability generating function for k is given by
gk() =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0BBBBB@1   pT   p(1   pT)2   4pD pE2pE
1CCCCCAk (pE , 0); 
pD
1   pT
!k
(pE = 0):
(4.8)
The proofs of Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 are given in Appendix A.3 and Appendix A.4,
respectively. In the next subsection, we derive the expectations and the variances of the
number of relay nodes and the number of encryption from Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3.
At the end of this subsection, we derive a condition about the probabilities of mode
selections by considering the above two probability generating functions. As shown in Eq.
(4.4), the value of the probability generating functions at  = 1 means the probability that
messages reach receivers because gX(1) = P1r=0 P(X = r). From Eqs. (4.7) and (4.8), we
obtain
gk(1) = gk(1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 
pE + pD  j pE   pD j
2pE
!k
(pE , 0);
1 (pE = 0):
(4.9)
In order to ensure that messages certainly reach receivers, the value of Eq. (4.9) should be
equal to 1. Thus, we require the following assumption [53].
Assumption 4.1 pD  pE.
4.4.2 Expectations and Variances
From Eqs. (4.5), (4.6), (4.7), and (4.8), we obtain the next theorems about the expectations
and the variances of the number of relay nodes and the number of encryption. The detailed
derivations for these values are given in Appendix A.5 and Appendix A.6.
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Theorem 4.3 The expectation MN and the variance VN of the number of relay nodes required
for communication are given by
MN =
k
pD   pE ; VN =
kf(1   pT)   (pD   pE)2g
(pD   pE)3 ;
respectively.
Theorem 4.4 The expectation ME and the variance VE of the number of encryption required
for communication are given by
ME =
k
1   pEpD
; VE =
k pEpD

1 + pEpD


1   pEpD
3 ;
respectively.
Notice that we use Assumption 4.1 in order to derive Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 4.4.
Their expectations and variances also include the dierence of pD and pE. Thus we need a
condition that pD is not equal to pE so that their values become finite values. In what follows,
we assume the following condition.
Assumption 4.2 pD > pE.
Theorem 4.3 states that the expectation of the number of relay nodes depends on the
initial multiplicity of encryption and the dierence of pD and pE. We also observe that its
variance can be controlled without changing its expectation by adjusting pT. From these
observations, we set pT to be large in order to keep the expectation unchanged and to reduce
the possibility that the number of relay nodes becomes extremely large.
From Theorem 4.4, we observe that both the expectation and the variance of the number
of encryption depend on the initial multiplicity of encryption and the proportion of pD and
pE. From the two equations, we obtain the following equation:
VE =
ME(ME   k)(2ME   k)
k2 :
This implies that the expectation and the variance of the number of encryption are not inde-
pendent. Thus it is shown that we cannot reduce the possibility that the number of encryption
becomes large under the condition that the expectation is constant. This equation also indi-
cates that VE increases monotonically with ME since ME = k.
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Figure 4.1: Probability distributions of the number of relay nodes.
4.5 Numerical Examples
In this section, we consider the impacts of the probabilities of mode selections through nu-
merical examples. We consider the following two cases under the condition that k = 2: Case
A: (pD; pE; pT) = (0:50; 0:43; 0:07) and Case B: (pD; pE; pT) = (0:10; 0:03; 0:87).
Note that the dierences between pD and pE in Case A and Case B are the same. The
expectations of relay nodes are the same, whereas pT and proportions of pD and pE are quite
dierent.
First, we compare the probability distributions of the number of relay nodes. We cal-
culate cumulative probabilities in order to compare those distributions in the case where the
number of relay nodes is large. The results of the probability distributions and the cumulative
probabilities of the number of relay nodes are shown in Fig. 4.1 and Table 4.1, respectively.
From Fig. 4.1, we observe that the probability distributions in Case A and Case B are quite
dierent, although their expectations are identical. Also, from Table 4.1, the probabilities
that the numbers of relay nodes are more than 50, 100, and 150 in Case A are about 13%,
6%, and 4%, respectively. In contrast, in Case B, those probabilities are about 14%, 3%, and
less than 1%, respectively. These results indicate that the spread of the distribution of the
number of relay nodes in Case B is smaller than that of Case A.
Furthermore, Table 4.2 compares those expectations and variances of the number of relay
nodes in these cases. The variance in Case B is quite smaller than that of Case A, whereas
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Table 4.1: Cumulative probabilities of the number of relay nodes.
The number of
relay nodes
(pD; pE; pT)
(0.50, 0.43, 0.07) (0.10, 0.03, 0.87)
20 0.7414 0.5037
50 0.8723 0.8551
100 0.9354 0.9735
150 0.9603 0.9940
Table 4.2: Expectations and variances of the number of relay nodes.
(pD; pE; pT) MN VN
(0.50, 0.43, 0.07) 28.57 5394
(0.10, 0.03, 0.87) 28.57 729.4
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Figure 4.2: Probability distributions of the number of encryption.
the expectations in Case A and Case B are identical. This means that, as indicated by The-
orem 4.3, we can reduce the variance of the number of relay nodes without changing the
expectation by setting pT to be larger.
Next, we consider the probability distributions of the number of encryption. The results
of the probability distributions and the cumulative probabilities of the number of encryption
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Table 4.3: Cumulative probabilities of the number of encryption.
The number of
encryption
(pD; pE; pT)
(0.50, 0.43, 0.07) (0.10, 0.03, 0.87)
10 0.7408 0.9953
20 0.8502 0.9999
30 0.8964 0.9999
50 0.9395 0.9999
Table 4.4: Expectations and variances of the number of encryption.
(pD; pE; pT) ME VE
(0.50, 0.43, 0.07) 14.29 1166
(0.10, 0.03, 0.87) 2.857 2.274
are shown in Fig. 4.2 and Table 4.3, respectively. Fig. 4.2 shows that the distribution in Case
A spreads widely than the distribution in Case B. From Table 4.3, the probabilities that the
numbers of encryption are more than 20, 30, and 50 in Case A are about 15%, 10%, and
6%, respectively. In contrast, in Case B, the probability that the number of encryption is
more than 10 is about 1%, and the probability that it exceeds 20 is small. In addition, Table
4.4 compares the expectations and the variances of the number of encryption in these cases.
From Table 4.4, the expectation and the variance in Case B are quite smaller than those of
Case A. This means that, as indicated by Theorem 4.4, it is shown that the expectation and
the variance of the number of encryption are quite dierent by the proportion of pD and pE.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have derived the probability distributions, the expectations, and the vari-
ances of the number of relay nodes and the number of encryption. These formulas have been
derived based on random walk theory, probability generating functions, and their proper-
ties. Using these formulas, it is possible to analyze the eect of the probabilities of mode
selections on the performance of 3MN. Theorem 4.3 indicates that the expectation of the
number of relay nodes depends on the dierence of the probabilities to choose D-Mode and
E-Mode, and the expectation becomes large when its dierence is small. Further, it is shown
that the probability to choose T-Mode is set to be large in order to avoid the situation where
the number of relay nodes is extremely large. Theorem 4.4 implies that the expectation and
the variance of the number of encryption depend on the proportion of the probabilities to
choose D-Mode and E-Mode, and the expectation and the variance become large when its
proportion is large.

Chapter 5
Analysis of Anonymity for Anonymous
Communication System 3-Mode Net
Against Collaborating Nodes
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we evaluate sender anonymity against collaborating nodes who collude with
each other in order to identify a message sender. We refer to a node who forwards a mes-
sage to the next node as an immediate predecessor, and consider the probability that the first
immediate predecessor among all the collaborating nodes on the communication path coin-
cides with the message sender. In what follows, we call this probability the probability of
the message sender.
The reason why we use the probability of the message sender is that the probability of
the message sender has been introduced in the literature as a standard measure for sender
anonymity in anonymous communication systems [30, 54, 55, 56]. This probability was first
employed in [4] for the analysis of sender anonymity in Crowds. The evaluation method
is very simple because it only uses the probabilities of mode selections, the number of col-
laborating nodes, and the number of 3MN members, and it does not consider other attacks
such as eavesdropping and timing attacks [57]. Thus we employ this measure for analyzing
sender anonymity in 3MN.
The probability of the message sender is derived from a probability generating function.
Using the result, we consider the influences of the probabilities of mode selections and the
initial multiplicity of encryption on sender anonymity against collaborating nodes. From the
results described in Chapter 4, we also describe useful results for a better understanding of
the influences of the probabilities of mode selections on the performance of 3MN by showing
the relationship between the number of relay nodes and sender anonymity as well as their
properties. This chapter is related to the work published in [58].
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Figure 5.1: An example of collaborating nodes.
5.2 Analysis of Anonymity of 3-Mode Net
In this section, we evaluate sender anonymity against collaborating nodes. To simplify the
discussion, we assume that the number of all nodes in 3MN network is constant. In addition,
suppose that collaborating nodes do not carry out any other attacks, e.g., eavesdropping,
timing attacks [57], passive attacks [59], and so on. We also assume that the sender and the
receiver are not the members of collaborating nodes.
5.2.1 Collaborating Nodes
Collaborating nodes are members in 3MN network that collude with each other in order
to illegally acquire the identity of a message sender. An example of collaborating nodes
on a communication path is shown in Fig. 5.1, where node F, node G, and node H are
collaborating nodes and the other nodes are non-collaborating nodes. In this example, sender
S creates a communication path to receiver R, which includes collaborating nodes F and
H. The collaborating nodes, including collaborating node G who does not appear on the
communication path, want to know which of the non-collaborating node is a message sender.
Collaborating nodes know from whom they receive a data set and to whom they send its
data set besides the common information of all members: the probabilities of mode selec-
tions, the initial multiplicity of encryption, the number of 3MN members, and the number
of collaborating nodes in 3MN. They gain no other useful information because they perform
no other attacks such as trac analysis. Therefore, they only investigate the trac flow of a
data set on 3MN network.
No receivers of messages are collaborating nodes. The reason is that, in 3MN, receivers
obtain special information relevant to senders in order to reply to received messages. This
case when receivers are collaborating nodes is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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5.2.2 Sender Anonymity Against Collaborating Nodes
In order to measure sender anonymity, we derive the probability of the message sender that
means that the first immediate predecessor among all the collaborating nodes on the commu-
nication path is indeed a message sender, where we refer to a node who forwards a message
to the next node as an immediate predecessor. In the example of Fig. 5.1, the probability
of the message sender indicates the probability that node B is a message sender because the
first immediate predecessor among collaborating nodes F, G, and H is node B. This mea-
sure is very simple because it only uses the probabilities of mode selections, the number of
collaborating nodes, and the number of 3MN members. This is also a standard measure for
evaluating sender anonymity in anonymous communication systems [4, 30, 54, 55, 56]. Our
approach is the same as that in [4] for Crowds. Thus we derive the probability of the message
sender in a way similar to [4].
Let Li (i = 1) denote the event where the first collaborating node on the communication
path appears at the i-th node on the path, and define Li+ = Li _ Li+1 _ Li+2 _    . Also, let J
denote the event where the first immediate predecessor among the immediate predecessors
on the communication path is a message sender.
Note here that the 0-th node indicates a message sender and the sender might appear on
the communication path several times. Further, the events J and L1 are dierent. The reason
is that J includes a situation that the first immediate predecessor on the communication path
is the message sender by chance because the message sender appears several times.
We consider the conditional probability P(J j L1+) that the first immediate predecessor
among all the collaborating nodes is the message sender, under the condition that one of the
collaborating nodes receives a data set. Unlike the simple situation such as Crowds, it is
rather hard to derive the probability because we have to compute infinite series concerning
L1+ which is very complicated for 3MN case. In order to avoid the computation of the infinite
series, we use a probability generating function and its properties. Using the function, we
obtain the following theorem that concerns the probability of the message sender.
Theorem 5.1 Let nt and nc denote the number of 3MN members and that of collaborating
nodes in 3MN, respectively. Then, the conditional probability P(JjL1+) is given by
P(J j L1+) =
(nt   nc)(nc + 1)   nt  gk
nt   nc
nt

nt(nt   nc)
n
1   gk
nt   nc
nt
o ; (5.1)
where gk() is a probability generating function for a random variable k representing the
number of relay nodes, defined by Eq. (4.7) in Chapter 4.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: The conditional probability P(J j L1+) is obtained by the following
equation:
P(J j L1+) = P(J ^ L1+)P(L1+) =
P(J)
P(L1+) =
P(J j L1)P(L1) + P(J j L2+)P(L2+)
P(L1+) : (5.2)
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In the second equality, we use P(J ^ L1+) = P(J) because J implies L1+. Note also that
P(L1) = nc=nt, P(J j L1) = 1, and P(J j L2+) = 1=(nt   nc). The third equality indicates that
if the first collaborating node receives a data set through several nodes, the first immediate
predecessor of the collaborating node is randomly chosen among non-collaborating nodes
equally likely [4].
In order to calculate Eq. (5.2), we have to compute P(L1+). This value is calculated as
follows:
P(L1+) = 1   gk
 
nt   nc
nt
!
: (5.3)
The derivation of this equation is given in Appendix A.7.
From Eqs. (5.2) and (5.3), P(J j L1+) is computed as follows:
P(J j L1+) =
(nt   nc)(nc + 1)   nt  gk
nt   nc
nt

nt(nt   nc)
n
1   gk
nt   nc
nt
o : (5.4)

As seen from Eq. (5.1), P(J j L1+) depends on the probability generating function gk().
In order to evaluate P(J j L1+), we need to analyze gk(). In the following subsections, we
derive properties of gk(), and consider the influences of the probabilities of mode selections
and the initial multiplicity of encryption on the sender anonymity in 3MN.
5.2.3 Properties of a Probability Generating Function
When we need to indicate pD and pE explicitly for expressing gk(), we use the notation
gfk;pD;pEg(). Concerning the probability generating function gk(), the following lemma is
obtained.
Lemma 5.1 Under Assumption 4.2, the probability generating function gk() has the fol-
lowing properties:
(i) gk() is a monotonically increasing function of  on 0    1 where gk(0) = 0 and
gk(1) = 1.
(ii) 0 < gk() < 1 ( 2 (0; 1)).
(iii) There exists  2 (0; 1) such that gfk;pD1 ;pE1 g() = gfk;pD2 ;pE2 g() =  if and only if  is
a solution of (pE1   pE2)x   (pD1   pD2) = 0 satisfying  2 (0; 1).
(iv) One of the following inequalities holds for every  2 (0; 1) if and only if there is no
 2 (0; 1) satisfying (pE1   pE2)   (pD1   pD2) = 0.
gfk;pD1 ;pE1 g() > gfk ;pD2 ;pE2 g();
gfk;pD1 ;pE1 g() < gfk ;pD2 ;pE2 g():
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(v) When pE is constant, gk() increases with pD for every  2 (0; 1).
(vi) When pD is constant, gk() decreases as pE increases for every  2 (0; 1).
(vii) When pD   pE is constant, gk() increases with pD (and therefore pE) for every  2
(0; 1).
(viii) gk() decreases as k increases for every  2 (0; 1).
Proof of Lemma 5.1: In order to prove (i) - (vii) of Lemma 5.1, it suces to show for the
case of k = 1 because gk() = (g1())k. Further (viii) is a direct consequence of (ii) for
k = 1. Consequently we prove statements (i) - (vii) for k = 1.
(i) It is straightforward from the definition (4.4) in Chapter 4, because P(1 = r)  0 (r =
0; 1;    ), P(1 = 0) = 0, and P1r=0 P(1 = r) = 1.
(ii) It is a direct consequence of (i).
(iii) First, we show “only if” part. Note that, as seen from Eq. (A.14), g1() is a solution of
the following equation:
pEx2 + (1   pD   pE   1=)x + pD = 0: (5.5)
From the condition of the left-hand side of (iii), we obtain the following equation:
pE1
2 + (1   pD1   pE1   1=) + pD1 = pE22 + (1   pD2   pE2   1=) + pD2 : (5.6)
From this equation, we obtain
f(pE1   pE2)   (pD1   pD2)g(   1) = 0: (5.7)
Since  , 1 for  2 (0; 1), we obtain the condition of the right-hand side of (iii).
Next, we prove “if” part. We show that  is the smaller solution of the following two
equations for some  2 (0; 1) when there exists  2 (0; 1) satisfying (pE1   pE2)   (pD1  
pD2) = 0.
pE1 x
2 + (1   pD1   pE1   1=)x + pD1 = 0; (5.8)
pE2 x
2 + (1   pD2   pE2   1=)x + pD2 = 0: (5.9)
To this end, we show that there exists  2 (0; 1) such that the value of Eq. (5.6) is equal to 0,
and that the smaller solution of Eq. (5.5) is less than 1 when  2 (0; 1). From (pE1   pE2)  
(pD1   pD2) = 0, it follows that f(pE1   pE2)   (pD1   pD2)g(   1) = 0, and thus, we obtain
pE1
2 + (1   pD1   pE1) + pD1 = pE22 + (1   pD2   pE2) + pD2 : (5.10)
Here let  = =l where l represents the value of Eq. (5.10). In this case, from Eq. (5.10), it
is easy to show that the value of Eq. (5.6) is equal to 0. Next, we show  = =l 2 (0; 1), that
is, l    > 0. Since 0 <  < 1 and pD1 > pE1 , we obtain the following inequality:
l    = pE12   (pD1 + pE1) + pD1 = (pD1   pE1)(1   ) > 0: (5.11)
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Finally, we show that the smaller solution of Eq. (5.5) is less than 1 if  2 (0; 1). When
pE = 0, x = pD=fpD + (1  1=)g is the only solution of Eq. (5.5) and it is easy to see that the
solution is less than 1. When pE = 0, it suces to show that
 1   pD   pE   1=
2pE
> 1; (5.12)
when  2 (0; 1). Since 0 <  < 1 and pD > pE, we obtain the following equation.
 1   pD   pE   1=
2pE
  1 = 1
2pE
(
1

(1   ) + pD   pE
)
> 0: (5.13)
This completes the proof of (iii) of Lemma 5.1.
(iv) This is a direct consequence of (iii).
(v) Suppose that pE1 = pE2 = pE and pD1 < pD2 . In this case, there is no  2 (0; 1) satisfying
the equation (pE1   pE2)   (pD1   pD2) = 0. Thus, one of the inequalities in (iv) holds.
Note here that, from Eq. (4.5) and Theorem 4.3 in Chapter 4, we have g01(1) = 1=(pD   pE).
Thus, we obtain g0f1;pD1 ;pEg(1) > g
0
f1;pD2 ;pEg(1). Using these facts, we obtain gf1;pD1 ;pEg() <
gf1;pD2 ;pEg() for every  2 (0; 1).(vi) In a manner similar to the proof of (v), we can obtain gf1;pD;pE1 g() > gf1;pD;pE2 g() for
every  2 (0; 1), when pE1 < pE2 .
(vii) Suppose that pD1   pE1 = pD2   pE2 , pD1 < pD2 , and pE1 < pE2 . In this case, we have
pD1 pD2 = pE1 pE2 , and thus, there is no  2 (0; 1) satisfying the equation (pE1 pE2) (pD1 
pD2)=0. Therefore, the condition (iv) is satisfied also in this case, and one of the inequality
of (iv) holds. Note here that, from the definition (4.4), we have g01(0)=P(1=1)= pD. Con-
sequently, we obtain g0f1;pD1 ;pE1 g(0) < g
0
f1;pD2 ;pE2 g(0) in this case. Using these facts, we obtain
gf1;pD1 ;pE1 g() < gf1;pD2 ;pE2 g() for every  2 (0; 1). 
5.2.4 Evaluation of Sender Anonymity
From the results of the preceding subsection, we evaluate sender anonymity in 3MN.
a) Influences of the Probabilities of Mode Selections
Using Theorem 5.1 and Lemma 5.1, we investigate the influences of the probabilities of
mode selections. From Theorem 5.1, P(J j L1+) is rewritten to be
P(J j L1+) = 11   gk()
 
nc + 1
nt
  1
nt   nc
!
+
1
nt   nc : (5.14)
Since nt  nc + 2, the following equation holds.
nc + 1
nt
  1
nt   nc =
nc(nt   nc   1)
nt(nt   nc) > 0: (5.15)
From the above equations and the statement (ii) of Lemma 5.1, we have the following theo-
rem.
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Theorem 5.2
P(J j L1+) > 1
nt   nc : (5.16)
The right-hand side of Eq. (5.16) is the probability that a randomly chosen node is
the sender. Therefore, Theorem 5.2 implies that the first immediate predecessor among
the immediate predecessors of the collaborating nodes is the most presumable in all non-
collaborating nodes whatever the probabilities of mode selections and the initial multiplicity
of encryption may be.
We also observe from Eqs. (5.14) and (5.15) that P(J j L1+) becomes large with gk().
From the statements (v) and (vi) of Lemma 5.1, the following theorem is obtained.
Theorem 5.3 P(J j L1+) has the following properties:
(i) When pE is constant, P(J j L1+) increases as pD increases.
(ii) When pD is constant, P(J j L1+) decreases as pE increases.
Consequently, in order to provide high anonymity to a sender, we set pD to be small and
pE to be large.
b) Influences of the Initial Multiplicity of Encryption
We consider the influences of the initial multiplicity of encryption on sender anonymity.
From the statement (viii) of Lemma 5.1, the following theorem is obtained.
Theorem 5.4 If k increases, P(J j L1+) decreases.
Therefore, by setting k to be large, we can provide high anonymity to a sender.
When k goes to infinity, we can derive the following theorem.
Theorem 5.5 Let nt and nc denote the number of 3MN members and that of collaborating
nodes in 3MN, respectively. Then, P(J j L1+) converges to (nc+1)=nt whatever pD, pE, and
pT may be as k goes to infinity. In addition, this value is larger than 1=(nt nc).
Proof of Theorem 5.5: From the statement (ii) of Lemma 5.1, together with the fact that
gk() = g1()k, limk!1 gk()=0 (0<<1). Thus, we obtain
lim
k!1
P(J j L1+) = nc + 1
nt
: (5.17)
The last statement of Theorem 5.5 is derived from Eq. (5.15). 
Theorem 5.5 implies that even though the number of the initial multiplicity of encryption
goes to infinity, the probability that the first immediate predecessor among the immediate
predecessors of the collaborating nodes is the sender does not approach to the probability
that a randomly chosen node is the sender.
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5.3 Relationship between the Number of Relay Nodes and
Sender Anonymity
In this section, we consider the relationship between the number of relay nodes and sender
anonymity in 3MN.
First, we consider the relationship between the expectation of the number of relay nodes
and sender anonymity. From Theorem 4.3 in Section 4.4.2, in order to reduce the expectation
of the number of relay nodes, we have to set pD to be large, pE to be small, and k to be small.
In contrast, as discussed in Section 5.2, in order to provide high sender anonymity, we have
to set pD to be small, pE to be large, and k to be large. Accordingly, there is a trade-o
between the expectation of the number of relay nodes and sender anonymity.
Next, in order to reduce the variance of the number of relay nodes while the expectation
remains constant and to provide high sender anonymity, we investigate the variation of P(J j
L1+) when pT increases under the condition that pD pE is constant. Using the statement (vii)
of Lemma 5.1, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 5.6 P(J j L1+) decreases as pT increases, when pD pE is constant.
Theorem 5.6 indicates that it is possible to reduce the variance of the number of relay
nodes with the expectation unchanged and to keep high sender anonymity. Therefore, it is
shown that we set pT to be large in order to reduce the situation that the number of relay
nodes becomes extremely large and to provide high anonymity to a sender.
5.4 Numerical Examples
5.4.1 Eects of the Probabilities of Mode Selections
In this subsection, we consider the influence of the probabilities of mode selections on sender
anonymity against collaborating nodes through numerical examples.
First, we illustrate sender anonymity under the condition that k = 2, nt = 10, and nc = 1.
Fig. 5.2 shows sender anonymity under the various probabilities of mode selections in the
region satisfying 0 < pD < 1, 0 < pE < 1, 0 < pD+ pE < 1 (this corresponds to 0 < pT < 1),
and pD > pE. From Fig. 5.2, we observe that P(J j L1+) becomes large with pD under the
condition that pE is constant. Also, as pE becomes small, P(J j L1+) becomes large under
the condition that pD is constant. These results show that sender anonymity degrades when
we set pD to be large and pE to be small. In order to provide high anonymity, we must set
pD to be small and pE to be large. In such a situation, however, the number of relay nodes
becomes large as discussed in Section 4.4. Consequently, as discussed in Section 5.3, there
is a performance trade-o between sender anonymity and the number of relay nodes required
for communication.
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Figure 5.2: Sender anonymity under the various probabilities of mode selections.
Table 5.1: Expectations and variances of the number of relay nodes and the number of en-
cryption, and sender anonymity.
(pD; pE; pT) (k = 1, nt = 10, nc = 1)
(0.50, 0.43, 0.07) (0.10, 0.03, 0.87) (0.75, 0.05, 0.20)
MN 14.29 14.29 1.429
VN 2697 364.7 0.9038
ME 7.143 1.426 1.071
VE 582.9 1.137 0.08746
P(J j L1+) 0.3728 0.2695 0.7564
Second, in order to investigate the eects of the probabilities of mode selections on
sender anonymity together with the number of relay nodes and the number of encryption,
we consider the following three cases under the condition that k = 1: Case A: (pD, pE,
pT)=(0.50, 0.43, 0.07), Case B: (pD, pE, pT)=(0.10, 0.03, 0.87), and Case C: (pD, pE,
pT)=(0.75, 0.05, 0.20). Case A and Case B were also considered in Section 4.5. The reason
for k = 1 is to see the influence of mode probabilities for sender anonymity more clearly.
The numerical results of the expectations and the variances of the number of relay nodes and
the number of encryption, and the conditional probability P(J j L1+) are shown in Table 5.1,
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Table 5.2: Sender anonymity in the several initial multiplicity of encryption.
(pD; pE; pT) (nt = 10, nc = 1)
(0.50, 0.43, 0.07) (0.10, 0.03, 0.87) (0.75, 0.05, 0.20)
k = 1 0.3728 0.2695 0.7654
k = 2 0.2687 0.2212 0.4621
k = 3 0.2360 0.2082 0.3617
k = 5 0.2128 0.2015 0.2827
k = 10 0.2014 0.2000 0.2269
k = 100 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000
where MN, VN, ME, and VE stand for the expectation and the variance of the number of relay
nodes, and the expectation and the variance of the number of encryption, respectively. From
Table 5.1, we observe that P(J j L1+) = 0:3728 in Case A and P(J j L1+) = 0:2695 in Case B.
If collaborating nodes tried to identify a message sender without any information other than
the number of 3MN members and that of collaborating nodes, all non-collaborating nodes
would seem to be the message sender equally likely, i.e., 1=(nt   nc) = 1=9 = 0:1111. Com-
pared with this, P(J j L1+) in Case A and P(J j L1+) in Case B are larger, yet less than 0:5.
Therefore, sender anonymity is maintained in these two examples, because it is shown that
sender anonymity is provided in [4] if P(J j L1+) is less than 0.5.
From Table 5.1, 3MN in Case C hardly maintains sender anonymity because P(J j L1+) =
0:7564. In Case C, the first relay node sends the message to a message receiver with high
probability 0.75, and thus the number of relay nodes and the number of encryption are quite
small. When the number of relay nodes and the number of encryption become small, sender
anonymity becomes small. Consequently, we conclude that sender anonymity deteriorates
when the inappropriate probabilities of mode selections are chosen so that the number of
relay nodes and the number of encryption are quite small.
We also observe that sender anonymity for Case A and Case B is dierent although the
expectations of the number of relay nodes are identical. It follows from this observation that
there exist the probabilities of mode selections, which yield small numbers of relay nodes
and encryption, and high sender anonymity. This is the same as the discussion in Section
5.3. Note here that we have to consider how much anonymity is guaranteed for a message
receiver because the behavior of 3MN in Case B is almost similar to that of Crowds and
Crowds does not provide receiver anonymity. Therefore, in order to consider the security
and the performance of 3MN, we need to analyze 3MN in more detail.
5.4.2 Eects of the Initial Multiplicity of Encryption
In this subsection, using the three cases in the above examples, we examine the influence
of the initial multiplicity of encryption on sender anonymity through numerical examples.
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Table 5.2 indicates that, in the examples, the probabilities P(J j L1+) between k = 1 and
k= 2 vary widely. This implies that, considering the performance of 3MN, it is appropriate
to select k = 2 as the initial multiplicity of encryption. We also observe that P(J j L1+)
converges to 0.2 whatever pD, pE, and pT may be, when k becomes large. This value is larger
than the probability 1=(nt nc)=1=9, as stated in Theorem 5.5.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed sender anonymity for 3MN against collaborating nodes.
In order to evaluate sender anonymity in 3MN, we have considered collaborating nodes who
try to identify a message sender, and have derived the conditional probability that the first
immediate predecessor among all the collaborating nodes is the message sender when a
collaborating node receives the message. This conditional probability has been represented
by a probability generating function. Through the analysis, we clarified that
 Our approach needs no infinite series unlike the method employed in Crowds.
 The probability to choose D-Mode is set to be small and the probability to choose
E-Mode is set to be large in order to provide high sender anonymity.
 The initial multiplicity of encryption is equal to 2 through simulations.
 The probability to choose T-Mode is set to be large in order to keep high sender
anonymity and to reduce the variance of the number of relay nodes under the con-
dition that its expectation is constant.
Although we analyzed sender anonymity in 3MN, we do not investigate receiver anonymity.
As shown in Section 5.3, if the probability to choose T-Mode is set very large, receiver
anonymity might be lost because the behavior of 3MN is similar to that of Crowds. Thus,
we need to consider receiver anonymity as well as sender anonymity.

Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Directions
In this dissertation, we have discussed policy integration and anonymous communication for
protecting personal information. These techniques are essential to protect personal informa-
tion from the viewpoint of the life-cycle of personal information. The development of policy
integration and anonymous communication systems enables us to prevent information leak-
age as well as to hide the information of a sender and a receiver. The contents and the results
of this dissertation are summarized below.
In Chapter 3, we have introduced a matrix-based algorithm for integrating inheritance
relations of access rights for policy integration. Since the integration of inheritance relations
plays an especially important role in the framework of policy integration, we have focused
on the method for integrating inheritance relations of access rights. The main characteristics
of our algorithms are as follows: 1) our integration algorithm can deal with inheritance re-
lations in subject, resource, and action categories; 2) our algorithm is easily implementable.
Introducing inheritance relations in three categories, we can apply our algorithm for existing
access rights management systems, i.e., Microsoft Windows R Rights Management Services
and Adobe R LivecycleTM Rights Management ES. We have also proved that operations nec-
essary for integrating inheritance relations can be carried out by basic matrix operations in
order to provide the second characteristics.
In order to clarify the influences of the probabilities of mode selections on the behavior
of an anonymous communication system named 3-Mode Net (3MN), we have analyzed the
performance of 3MN quantitatively. In Chapter 4, we have analyzed the number of relay
nodes and the number of encryption required for communication in 3MN. We have given
explicit formulas of their probability distributions, expectations, and variances. In Chapter
5, we have evaluated sender anonymity against collaborating nodes who collude with each
other in order to identify a message sender. We have derived the conditional probability that
the first immediate predecessor of all the collaborating nodes on the communication path
coincides with the message sender under the condition that a collaborating node receives a
data set. Introducing probability generating functions, our approach needs no infinite series
unlike the method employed in Crowds. Through the analysis of the performance of 3MN,
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it is shown that
 The probability to choose T-Mode is set to be large in order to keep sender anonymity
and to reduce the variance of the number of relay nodes under the condition that its
expectation is constant.
 There is no way of selecting the probabilities of mode selections for reducing the vari-
ance of the number of encryption under the condition that its expectation is constant.
 The probability to choose D-Mode is set to be small and the probability to choose
E-Mode is set to be large in order to provide high sender anonymity.
 The initial multiplicity of encryption is equal to 2 through simulations.
Let us discuss future work in policy integration and anonymous communication systems.
One of the most significant problems about our policy integration framework is that our al-
gorithm will stop if an administrator thinks that the conflicts caused by the integration yield
serious problems. Thus we have to improve the algorithm so as to preclude the inheritance
relations which may cause conflicts, and to continue the integration process without the
inheritance relations. Our framework also does not address inheritance relations of access
rights which do not satisfy the independence assumption. Thus we need to extend our frame-
work. Furthermore, access rights management technologies include many technologies, and
many systems are used in practice. Therefore, the implementation of our policy integration
framework to a centralized access rights management system together with policy refinement
and policy conflict detection/resolution technologies [6, 7, 10, 11, 13] is an important future
topic of our study.
We next consider future issues on 3MN. Although we evaluate the number of relay nodes,
the number of encryption, and sender anonymity, we do not evaluate receiver anonymity
against collaborating nodes. To define receiver anonymity against collaborating nodes is nec-
essary for investigating sender-receiver anonymity and the relationship between the number
of relay nodes and sender-receiver anonymity. We should also investigate anonymity in 3MN
against other attacks such as eavesdropping and timing attacks because sender anonymity
and receiver anonymity might not be guaranteed under particular conditions. In order to
confirm the utility of 3MN in practice, the implementation of 3MN is now on-going. We
need to compare 3MN to anonymous communication systems used on the Internet, such as
Tor [36, 60], Mixminion [38], and Freenet [39]. Further, there may exist a lot of challenges
on the implementation, i.e., the issue on public key encryption [61] and the issue on the
network topology of 3MN [55, 62, 63].
Although we focus on policy integration and anonymous communication, technologies
for protecting personal information are closely related to other technologies such as authen-
tication, digital signature, and automated trust negotiation. In particular, we pay attention to
automated trust negotiation [64, 65]. In the future, we will consider a new framework for
protecting personal information by integrating several technologies.
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Finally, through this research, we have developed two technologies for protecting per-
sonal information, policy integration and anonymous communication. We hope that this
research will make some contributions toward the development of novel technologies for
protecting personal information.
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Appendix A
Proofs and Derivations
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.5
Let X and Y denote square matrices of order n and order m, respectively. Since the graphs
associated with X and Y do not include circuits, we obtain the following equations from
Theorem 3.1.
Xp = 0 (8p  n); Yq = 0 (8q  m): (A.1)
In order to prove Theorem 3.5, it suces to show that (A  B)mn = 0. To this end, we apply
the following basic properties of Kronecker product [48].
(X 
 Im)p = Xp 
 Im; (A.2)
(In 
 Y)q = In 
 Yq; (A.3)
(X 
 Im)  (In 
 Y) = (In 
 Y)  (X 
 Im); (A.4)
(X  Y)l =
lX
p=0
(X 
 Im)p  (In 
 Y)l p: (A.5)
From Eq. (A.1) together with Eqs. (A.2), (A.3), (A.4), and (A.5), the following equations
are obtained.
¯Xp = 0 (8p  n); ¯Yq = 0 (8q  m); (A.6)
(X  Y)mn =
mnX
p=0
¯Xp ¯Ymn p; (A.7)
where ¯X = X 
 Im and ¯Y = In 
 Y . Note here that mn  n+ 1  m because (m  1)(n  1)  0.
Hence, from Eq. (A.1), we obtain
(X  Y)mn =
n 1X
p=0
¯Xp ¯Ymn p =
mnX
q=mn n+1
¯Xmn q ¯Yq = 0: (A.8)

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A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.6
Let X = [xi j] and Y = [yi j] denote square matrices of order n and order m, respectively. In
this proof, x(l)i j and y
(l)
i j denote the (i; j)-element of Xl and Y l, respectively.
Since the graphs associated with X and Y do not include circuits and redundant edges,
the following equations are obtained from Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2.
x
(l)
ii = 0 (1  i  n; l  1); (A.9)
y(l)ii = 0 (1  i  m; l  1): (A.10)
From Theorem 3.3, we obtain for l , 2
x
(l)
i j = 0; if xi j = 1 (i , j); (A.11)
y(l)i j = 0; if yi j = 1 (i , j): (A.12)
From Eqs. (A.2), (A.3), (A.4), and (A.5), (X  Y)l (l  2) is calculated as follows:
(X  Y)l =
lX
z=0
(X 
 Im)l(In 
 Y)l z =
lX
z=0
(Xz 
 Im)(In 
 Y l z)
=
lX
z=0
266666666664
x
(z)
11 Im    x(z)1n Im
:::
: : :
:::
x
(z)
n1 Im    x(z)nn Im
377777777775 
26666666664
Y l z 0
: : :
0 Y l z
37777777775
=
lX
z=0
266666666664
x
(z)
11Y
l z    x(z)1nY l z
:::
: : :
:::
x
(z)
n1Y
l z    x(z)nnY l z
377777777775 :
On the other hand, (X  Y) is calculated as
(X  Y) = (X 
 Im) + (In 
 Y) =
266666666666666664
Y x12Im    x1nIm
x21Im Y
:::
:::
: : : xn 1nIm
xn1Im    xnn 1Im Y
377777777777777775 :
In order to prove Theorem 3.6, it suces to show the following propositions:
(i) If yi j = 1 (i , j), then the (i; j)th element of Plz=0 x(z)ppY l z is equal to 0 for p = 1;    n
and l  2.
(ii) If xi j = 1 (i , j), then the diagonal elements of Plz=0 x(z)i j Y l z are equal to 0 for l  2.
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Concerning proposition (i), we obtain Plz=0 x(z)ppY l z = Y l from Eq. (A.9), because for
every p, x(z)pp = 1 if and only if z = 0. From Eq. (A.12), when yi j = 1 (i , j), the (i; j)th
element of Y l is equal to 0 for l  2, from which proposition (i) follows.
Concerning proposition (ii), we obtain Plz=0 x(z)i j Y l z = Y l 1 from Eq. (A.11), because for
i , j, x(z)i j = 1 if and only if z = 1. From Eq. (A.10), the diagonal elements of Y l 1 are equal
to 0 for l  2, from which proposition (ii) follows.

A.3 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Let k denote a random variable, which represents the number of relay nodes required for
communication under the condition that the initial multiplicity of encryption is k. Then, from
Eq. (4.4), the probability generating function gk() for k can be written to be
gk() = E(k):
Since k is the sum of k copies of an independent variable 1, the probability generating
function gk() is calculated as follows:
gk() = E(k) = E(k1) = E(1)k = g1()k: (A.13)
This is derived from the relation that E(X+Y) = E(X)E(Y) when random variables X and
Y are independent. In order to derive gk(), we consider g1().
Considering the property of 3MN, we derive several conditions about g1(). First, since
the events choosing D-Mode, E-Mode, and T-Mode are mutually exclusive, we obtain
g1() = E(1) = E(1 j D) + E(1 j E) + E(1 j T);
where E(1 j X) represents the conditional expectation of 1 under the condition that X-
mode is chosen in the first transition.
Next, we consider the above conditional expectations E(1 j D), E(1 j E), and E(1 j
T). When D-Mode, E-Mode, and T-Mode are chosen, the multiplicities of encryption be-
come 0, 2, and 1 by one step, respectively. Therefore, the random variables of the conditional
expectations in D-Mode, E-Mode, and T-Mode become 1, 1 + 2, and 1 + 1, respectively.
Since the probabilities of mode selections are pD, pE, and pT, the conditional expectations
are given by
E(1 j D) = pDE(1) = pD;
E(1 j E) = pEE(1+2) = pEE(2) = pE(g1())2;
E(1 j T) = pTE(1+1) = pTE(1) = pT(g1());
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respectively. From these results, the following equation is obtained.
g1() = pD + pTg1() + pE(g1())2: (A.14)
When pD , 0, we obtain
g1() =
1   pT  
p
(1   pT)2   4pD pE2
2pE
;
where we use the condition that g1() has to be finite when  ! 0. As a result, we obtain
gk() =
0BBBBB@1   pT   p(1   pT)2   4pD pE22pE
1CCCCCAk :
When pE = 0, we obtain
g1() =
pD
1   pT:
In this case,
gk() =
 
pD
1   pT
!k
:

A.4 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Let k denote a random variable, which represents the number of encryption required for
communication under the condition that the initial multiplicity of encryption is k. Since k is
the sum of k copies of an independent variable 1, the probability generating function gk()
is given as follows:
gk() = E(k) = E(k1) = E(1)k = g1()k: (A.15)
In order to derive gk(), we consider g1().
For g1(), since the events choosing D-Mode, E-Mode, and T-Mode are mutually exclu-
sive, we obtain
g1() = E(1) = E(1 j D) + E(1 j E) + E(1 j T);
where E(1 j X) represents the conditional expectation of 1 under the condition that X-
mode is chosen in the first transition.
We consider the above conditional expectations E(1 j D), E(1 j E), and E(1 j T).
When D-Mode, E-Mode, and T-Mode are chosen, the multiplicities of encryption become
0, 2, and 1 by one step, respectively. Therefore, the random variables of the conditional
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expectations in D-Mode, E-Mode, and T-Mode become 1, 2, and 1, respectively. Since the
probabilities of mode selections are pD, pE, and pT, the conditional expectations are given
by
E(1 j D) = pDE(1) = pD;
E(1 j E) = pEE(2) = pE(g1())2;
E(1 j T) = pTE(1) = pT(g1());
respectively. From these results, the following equation is obtained.
g1() = pD + pTg1() + pE(g1())2: (A.16)
When pE , 0, we obtain
gk() =
1   pT  
p
(1   pT)2   4pD pE
2pE
;
where we use the condition that g1() has to be finite when  ! 0. Consequently, we obtain
gk() =
0BBBBB@1   pT   p(1   pT)2   4pD pE2pE
1CCCCCAk :
When pE = 0, we obtain
g1() =
pD
1   pT :
In this case, we obtain
gk() =
 
pD
1   pT
!k
:

A.5 Proof of Theorem 4.3
First, we derive the expectation of the number of relay nodes. From Eqs. (4.5) and (A.13),
the expectation MN can be written by
MN = E(k) = g0k(1) =

gk1(1)
0
= kgk 11 (1)g01(1):
In order to calculate the above value easily, we define fN() as
fN() = (1   pT)2   4pD pE2: (A.17)
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Thus, we obtain
g1() =
1   pT   f
1
2
N ()
2pE
; (A.18)
fN() = 1   pT + 12 f
0
N(); (A.19)
fN(1) = (pD   pE)2; (A.20)
f 0N(1) =  2(pD + pE) + 2(pD   pE)2: (A.21)
From Lemma 4.2, we obtain
g1(1) = 1: (A.22)
With Eqs. (A.18) and (A.19), g01() is rewritten to be
g01() =
1
22 pE
n
f   12N ()

  1
2
f 0N() + fN()

  1
o
=
1
22 pE

f   12N ()(1   pT)   1

=
1

f   12N ()
1   pT   f
1
2
N ()
2pE
=
1

f   12N ()g1(): (A.23)
From Eqs. (A.20), (A.22), and (A.23), the following equation is obtained.
g01(1) = f
  12
N (1)g1(1) =
1
pD   pE : (A.24)
Using Eq. (A.24), we obtain
MN = kgk 11 (1)g01(1) =
k
pD   pE :
Next, we derive the variance of the number of relay nodes. From Eqs. (4.6) and (A.13),
the variance VN can be written to be
VN = V(k) = g00k(1) + g0k(1)  

g0k(1)
2
=

gk1(1)
00
+

gk1(1)
0   ngk1(1)0o2:
The second derivative of gk1() is expressed by the following equation.
gk1()
00
= k
n
(k   1)gk 21 ()

g01()
2
+ gk 11 ()g001()
o
:
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Using Eq. (A.23), g001() is calculated as follows:
g001() =
d
d
1

f   12N ()g1()

=   1
2
f   12N ()g1()  
1
2
f   32N () f 0N()g1() +
1

f   12N ()g01()
=  1

g01()  
1
2
g01() f 0N() f  1N () +
1
2
f  1N ()g1(): (A.25)
From Eqs. (A.20), (A.21), (A.22), (A.24), and (A.25), we obtain
g001(1) =  
2
pD   pE +
1
(pD   pE)2
+
pD + pE
(pD   pE)3
: (A.26)
Using Eq. (A.26) together with Eqs. (A.22) and (A.24), we obtain
VN =
kf(1   pT)   (pD   pE)2g
(pD   pE)3 :

A.6 Proof of Theorem 4.4
First, we derive the expectation of the number of encryption. From Eqs. (4.5) and (A.15),
the expectation ME can be written to be
ME = E(k) = g0k(1) =

gk1(1)
0
= kgk 11 (1)g01(1):
In order to calculate the above value easily, we define fE() as
fE() = (1   pT)2   4pD pE: (A.27)
Thus, we obtain
g1() =
1   pT   f
1
2
E ()
2pE
; (A.28)
fE(1) = (pD   pE)2; (A.29)
f 0E() = f 0E(1) =  4pD pE: (A.30)
From Lemma 4.3, we obtain
g1(1) = 1: (A.31)
Using Eqs. (A.28) and (A.30), g01() is calculated as follows:
g01() =  
1
4pE
f   12E () f 0E() = pD f
  12
E (): (A.32)
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From Eqs. (A.29) and (A.32), the following equation is obtained.
g01(1) =
pD
pD   pE : (A.33)
Using Eqs. (A.31) and (A.33), we obtain
ME = kgk 11 (1)g01(1) =
k
1   pEpD
:
Next, we consider the variance of the number of encryption. From Eqs. (4.6) and (A.15),
the variance VE can be written to be
VE = V(k) = g00k(1) + g0k(1)  

g0k(1)
2
=

gk1(1)
00
+

gk1(1)
0   ngk1(1)0o2:
The second derivative of gk1() is expressed by the following equation.
gk1()
00
= k(k   1)gk 21 ()

g01()
2
+ kgk 11 ()g001():
From Eqs. (A.28), (A.30), and (A.32), g001() is calculated as follows:
g001() =  
1
2
pD f  
3
2
E () f 0E() = 2pD2 pE f
  32
E (): (A.34)
From Eqs. (A.29) and (A.34), we obtain
g001(1) =
2pD2 pE
(pD   pE)3
: (A.35)
Using Eq. (A.35) together with Eqs. (A.31) and (A.33), we obtain
VE =
k pEpD

1 + pEpD


1   pEpD
3 :

A.7 Derivation of Equation (5.3)
Let k denote a random variable representing the number of relay nodes required for commu-
nication under the condition that the initial multiplicity of encryption is k, and Pk(i) denote
the probability that the number of relay nodes required for communication is equal to i, that
is, Pk(i) = P(k = i). If the first collaborating node on the communication path appears at the
i-th node on the path, the number of relay nodes required for communication is larger than
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or equal to i. Therefore, the probability P(Li) that the first collaborating node on the path
appears at the i-th node on the path is given by
P(Li) =
1X
j=i
Pk( j)
 
nt   nc
nt
!i 1  
nc
nt
!
=
(
1  
i 1X
j=0
Pk( j)
)
i 1(1   );
where  = (nt   nc)=nt. As a result, P(L1+) is calculated as follows:
P(L1+) =
1X
i=1
P(Li) = (1   )
1X
i=1
8>><>>:1   i 1Xj=0 Pk( j)
9>>=>>; i 1
= 1   (1   )
1X
j=0
1X
i= j+1
Pk( j)i 1
= 1  
1X
j=0
Pk( j) j = 1   gk(); (A.36)
where the probability generating function gk() is given by Eq. (4.7) and we use the commu-
tativity of summations, which is guaranteed by the absolute convergence of double series in
Eq. (A.36). 

Publications
A. Journal Papers
1. K. Kono, Y. Ito, A. Aoyama, H. Kamoda, and N. Babaguchi, “Matrix-Based Algorithm
for Integrating Inheritance Relations of Access Rights for Policy Generation,” Journal
of Information Processing, Vol. 17, pp. 318–327, December 2009.
2. K. Kono, S. Nakano, Y. Ito, and N. Babaguchi, “A Consideration on the Numbers
of Relay Nodes and Encryption Required for Anonymous Communication System 3-
Mode Net,” Journal of Information Assurance and Security (to appear in 2010).
B. International Conference Papers
1. K. Kono, S Nakano, Y. Ito, and N. Babaguchi, “Security Analysis of Anonymous
Communication System 3-Mode Net Against Collaborating Nodes,” in Proc. Asia-
Pacific Signal and Information Processing Association Annual Summit and Conference
(APSIPA ASC 2009), pp. 105–110, October 2009.
2. K. Kono, S. Nakano, Y. Ito, and N. Babaguchi, “Performance Analysis of Anonymous
Communication System 3-Mode Net,” in Proc. 5th IEEE International Conference on
Information Assurance and Security (IAS 2009), pp. 593–596, August 2009.
C. Technical Reports
1. S. Nakano, K. Kono, Y. Ito, and N. Babaguchi, “Reduction of the Number of Relay
Nodes in Anonymous Communication System 3-Mode Net,” in Proc. 2009 Institute of
Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers (IEICE) General Conference,
A-7-8, p. 182, March 2009 (in Japanese).
2. T. Hanaoka, K. Kono, Y. Ito, and N. Babaguchi, “Automated Trust Negotiation among
Three Agent Based on Service Usage of Client,” in Proc. 2008 Institute of Electron-
ics, Information and Communication Engineers (IEICE) General Conference, A-7-10,
p. 182, March 2008 (in Japanese).
3. K. Kono, Y. Ito, A. Aoyama, H, Kamoda, and N. Babaguchi, “An Integration Method
of Access Control Policies Using Adjacency Matrix,” in The Special Interest Group
Notes of Information Processing Society of Japan (IPSJ), pp. 45–50, May 2007 (in
Japanese).
73
74 PUBLICATIONS
4. H. Kamoda, K. Kono, Y. Ito, and N. Babaguchi, “Access Control Policy Inconsistency
Check Using Model Checker,” in The Special Interest Group Notes of Information
Processing Society of Japan (IPSJ), pp. 441–446, March 2007 (in Japanese).
5. R. Tanihira, K. Kono, Y. Ito, and N. Babaguchi, “Fair Automated Trust Negotiation
with Credential Disclosure Points,” in Proc. 2007 Institute of Electronics, Information
and Communication Engineers (IEICE) General Conference, A-7-10, p. 214, March
2007 (in Japanese).
6. K. Kono, Y. Ito, and N. Babaguchi, “A Study on RSA Cryptosystem Using Pseudo-
primes,” in Proc. 2005 Society Conference of Institute of Electronics, Information and
Communication Engineers (IEICE), A-7-2, p. 175, September 2005 (in Japanese).
D. Award List
1. Best Paper Award
K. Kono, S. Nakano, Y. Ito, and N. Babaguchi, “Performance Analysis of Anonymous
Communication System 3-Mode Net,” in Proc. 5th IEEE International Conference on
Information Assurance and Security (IAS 2009), pp. 593–596, August 2009.
